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Increase the use and development of interventions known 
to prevent human illness from chemical, biological, or 




Decrease the time needed to classify health events as 
terrorism or naturally occurring in partnership with other 
agencies. 
Goal 3
Decrease the time needed to detect and report chemical, 
biological, or radiological agents in tissue, food or 
environmental samples that cause threats to the public’s 
health. 
Goal 4 Improve the timeliness and accuracy of communications regarding threats to the public’s health.
Investigate
Goal 5
Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and 




Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and 




Goal 7 Decrease the time needed to restore health services and environmental safety to pre-event levels.
Goal 8 Improve the long-term follow-up provided to those affected by threats to the public’s health.
Improve
Goal 9
Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations 
from after-action reports following threats to the public’s 
health.
CDC Preparedness Goals
CDC has established nine goals for achieving the overarching 
preparedness goal, “People prepared for emerging health threats –  
people in all communities will be protected from infectious,  
occupational, environmental, and terrorist threats.”
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Public Health Preparedness: Strengthening CDC’s Emergency Response describes the range 
of fiscal year (FY) 20071 Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) projects that 
received Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency 
Response (TPER) funding. Although there are 
other funding sources for preparedness activities 
at CDC, such as pandemic influenza, this report 
focuses on the activities supported by TPER 
funding. This funding represents significant 
preparedness investments by CDC, and supports 
a range of activities at CDC and at state and 
local levels to help develop the building blocks to 
respond to public health threats. 
This report builds on the analysis of state public 
health preparedness presented in the February 
2008 CDC report, Public Health Preparedness: 
Mobilizing State by State.2  Both reports are 
an important part of CDC’s overall focus 
on demonstrating results, driving program 
improvements, and increasing accountability 
for the nation’s investment in public health 
preparedness activities.
How the Report Is Organized
The report is designed to provide easily accessible 
information about CDC activities within five core 
public health functions: Health Monitoring and 
Surveillance, Epidemiology and Other Assessment 
Sciences, Public Health Laboratory Science and 
Service, Response and Recovery Operations, and 
Public Health System Support. 
The report begins with a chapter describing 
CDC’s unique role in preparing the nation to 
respond to a range of health threats and how 
this role fits into the framework of federal 
response activities. Each of the five chapters 
that follow describes preparedness activities and 
accomplishments and ends with a summary 
of challenges. The report concludes with the 
“Moving Forward” chapter, describing priorities 
for future preparedness activities.
How Different Audiences Can Use  
This Report
Public Health Preparedness: Strengthening CDC’s 
Emergency Response is written for a variety of 
audiences. Policymakers can use the report to 
examine the activities carried out using TPER 
funding in FY 2007 and the results that were 
achieved; they may be particularly interested in 
the “Moving Forward” chapter, which outlines 
the CDC priorities for addressing many of the 
challenges presented in the report. 
Within CDC, programs can use the report to gain 
a better understanding of how their work fits into 
the overall preparedness framework at CDC, and 
they may also consider the challenges presented to 
examine how their future work can help address 
these challenges.
This report can be used by other federal 
departments and agencies, and by CDC partners 
(e.g., state and local health officials and key public 
health associations) to learn more about the scope 
of CDC activities. Additionally, the report can 
be used by our partners to examine CDC-funded 
projects in the areas in which our partners work 
and to generate new ideas for collaboration.
Future Updates on 
Preparedness Investments
This report provides a snapshot of TPER-
funded activities, most of which are long-term 
investments that will continue in future years. 
To continue to promote the highest standards 
of accountability for TPER preparedness funds, 
future updates from CDC will assess the progress 
of preparedness at CDC and at local, state, tribal, 
territorial, and international levels.
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Public health threats are always present. Whether caused by diseases, natural disasters, 
or terrorist events, these threats can lead to the 
onset of public health emergencies. The effects 
these emergencies can have on the well-being of 
our nation became increasingly evident in the 
aftermath of such events as Hurricane Katrina 
in 2005, the outbreak of severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and the terrorist 
attacks of 2001. Being prepared to prevent, 
respond to, and recover rapidly from public 
health emergencies can save lives and protect the 
health and safety of the public and emergency 
responders. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) plays a key role in preparing our 
nation for public health threats that include 
natural, biological, chemical, radiological, and 
nuclear incidents. The vast majority of CDC 
preparedness and response activities use an all-
hazards approach; however, activities have begun 
that will expand critical capabilities needed for 
specific public health threats.
CDC preparedness goals, objectives, and 
core public health functions. CDC’s work in 
preparedness builds upon decades of science 
developed to promote public health. “People 
prepared for emerging health threats – people in 
all communities will be protected from infectious, 
occupational, environmental, and terrorist 
threats” is one of CDC’s four overarching health 
protection goals. CDC has identified nine specific 
outcome goals aimed at measuring progress 
toward this overarching goal (see inside front 
cover). 
To achieve the preparedness goals, CDC 
established five objectives that emerge 
from CDC’s core public health functions. 
The functions are Health Monitoring and 
Surveillance, Epidemiology and Other 
Assessment Sciences, Public Health Laboratory 
Science and Service, Response and Recovery 
Operations, and Public Health System Support. 
For more information on each of the objectives, 
see Table 1 on page 8.
Preparedness funding. Each year, Congress 
appropriates Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response (TPER) funds to CDC.
This funding supports a range of activities at 
CDC and state and local levels to help develop 
the capabilities and capacities needed to respond 
to public health threats. This report focuses 
on activities supported by fiscal year (FY) 
2007 TPER funding at CDC which totaled 
approximately $1.5 billion.3 CDC has other 
funding sources for preparedness activities 
associated with pandemic influenza; infectious 
disease research and response; and surveillance, 
investigation, and response to clarify and reduce 
the impact of the environment on human health.
Purpose of this report. This report provides an 
overview of FY 2007 TPER-funded public health 
preparedness activities, most of which are long-
term investments that are planned to continue in 
future years, depending on funding. In addition, 
the report details accomplishments as well as the 
challenges faced by CDC as it continues to reach 
for its preparedness goals.
Progress Continues
TPER funding has supported significant 
accomplishments in public health preparedness 
over the past decade. The following are highlights 
of these accomplishments:
Before 1999, there was no national stockpile •	
of medical supplies, and now CDC’s Strategic 
National Stockpile ensures that key medical 
supplies are available during emergencies. 
This approximately $3.5 billion resource has 
drugs, vaccines, and other medical supplies 
needed to protect the public from bioterrorist 
attacks.4 
Executive Summary
The Centers for 
Disease Control and 
Prevention plays a 
key role in preparing 
our nation for public 
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Before 1999, CDC performed all tests to •	
detect and confirm the presence of biological 
threat agents. In 1999, CDC created the 
Laboratory Response Network (LRN), which 
has grown to more than 160 laboratories 
nationwide that can perform these tests. 
In 2007, 90% of the U.S. population lived 
within 100 miles of an LRN laboratory, 
decreasing the time needed to begin 
responding to a terrorist attack or naturally 
occurring outbreak.
Before 1999, CDC provided no funding •	
to states and localities for public health 
preparedness; as of FY 2007, CDC had 
provided more than $5 billion in funding and 
technical assistance to help states improve 
their response capabilities through activities 
such as planning and readiness assessment, 
conducting exercises, increasing laboratory 
capacity, and enhancing communications. 
For a detailed description of the tremendous 
accomplishments at state and local public 
health departments, refer to the 2008 CDC 
report, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing 
State by State.5
Before 2000, no secure system was available •	
to share information about emerging 
health threats. Now, CDC’s Epidemic 
Information Exchange (Epi-X) provides a 
secure, web-based communication system 
that allows CDC officials, state and local 
health departments, poison control centers, 
and other public health professionals to 
quickly and securely share preliminary 
health surveillance information. Epi-X helps 
ensure that local problems are contained and 
national events are detected sooner.
In 2001, CDC headquarters for response •	
activities consisted of available conference 
rooms with limited equipment; since 
2003, CDC has operated a state-of-the-art 
command center to monitor health threats 
and coordinate emergency response around-
the-clock. The facility provides the tools for 
improved communication, faster detection, 
and coordinated response.
Before 2006, no data were immediately •	
available to systematically track the spread of 
health threats in emergency situations. Now 
BioSense obtains data from hospitals and 
healthcare organizations to support decision-
making during health emergencies. As part 
of a national strategy for biosurveillance, 
BioSense has the potential to improve 
recognition and response to a wide range of 
public health threats.
CDC continued to build on these 
accomplishments in FY 2007.  Major CDC 
activities and accomplishments for FY 2007 are 
outlined in Table 1 on page 8. For more details 
on each of these accomplishments, see the 
chapters listed in that table.
Challenges Remain
Challenges within each of the core public 
health functions. While much has been 
accomplished to enhance public health 
preparedness, many challenges remain. Specific 
challenges include the following:
Health Monitoring and Surveillance (see Chapter 2 
for details)
Implementing the next generation of •	
surveillance systems so that critical 
information is available to decision makers 
during an emergency
Enhancing surveillance of long-term health •	
effects so the impact of public health 
emergencies is understood and can be 
addressed
Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences (see 
Chapter 3 for details)
Enhancing research into the medicines and •	
medical supplies needed to combat infectious 
agents, screening guidelines for healthcare 
professionals, and protective equipment for 
first respondersSource: CDC
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Assisting vulnerable populations by •	
developing optimal strategies to protect 
against and respond to emergencies
Increasing the epidemiology and other •	
assessment sciences workforce to improve 
the nation’s ability to conduct disease 
investigations at local, state, and federal levels
Managing and enhancing data effectively •	
during an emergency so that data can be 
analyzed from multiple jurisdictions and 
multiple areas of expertise
Public Health Laboratory Science and Service (see 
Chapter 4 for details)
Adopting interoperable laboratory systems to •	
exchange data more quickly and accurately, 
reducing the time needed to detect and report 
health threats
Increasing radiological capacity to respond •	
effectively following a radiological incident 
(e.g., a dirty bomb or nuclear detonation)
Increasing personnel for laboratory surge •	
capacity so that the appropriate numbers 
of trained personnel can handle additional 
tests for extended periods of time during an 
emergency
Developing and enhancing laboratory •	
methods to decrease the time needed to 
identify, track, and respond to health threats
Response and Recovery Operations (see Chapter 5 
for details)
Exercising for potential public health threat •	
scenarios to enhance emergency response
Building surge capacity for CDC response •	
personnel so that CDC has sufficient 
numbers of qualified personnel to sustain 
operations for an effective response
Expanding the quarantine system to address •	
the growing concern about the threat of 
infectious diseases crossing U.S. borders
Improving emergency responder safety and •	
health by meeting their short- and long-term 
healthcare needs
Defining a research agenda for public •	
health preparedness, including vulnerable 
populations, to drive system improvements 
and initiate a comprehensive evaluation 
program for public health activities
Public Health System Support (see Chapter 6 for 
details)
Conducting program activities with •	
decreasing resources and deciding which 
activities can no longer be supported
Continuing technical assistance on •	
preparedness activities so that state and local 
health departments are supported at all stages 
of their preparedness work
Retaining experienced public health •	
response personnel at state and local health 
departments so that qualified personnel 
are available to staff a sustained emergency 
response
Bolstering legal preparedness for public •	
health so that states impacted by a disaster 
can request and receive assistance quickly and 
efficiently
Continuing to measure public health •	
preparedness to assist CDC and public 
health departments in identifying specific 
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CDC is prioritizing the allocation of resources 
for ongoing and future projects that respond 
to challenges that cut across multiple core 
public health functions.  Below are priorities 
of particular note that address cross-cutting 
challenges as we move forward.
Strengthening public health preparedness at 
federal, state, and local levels in a climate of 
decreasing resources.  With the anticipated 
decline in TPER funding in FY 2009, CDC and 
state and local health departments must find 
new ways, including enhanced collaborations, 
to conduct program activities.  CDC may also 
have to make difficult decisions about what 
the highest priority preparedness activities are 
and what must be postponed.  Public health 
departments at state and local levels may have to 
make similar choices.  
Integrating biosurveillance systems and 
activities. Health professionals must be able 
to recognize potential health emergencies as 
early as possible to prevent human deaths and 
mitigate suffering. This capability requires 
surveillance and integration of timely health-
related information to enable early detection 
and characterization of health threats and to 
maintain situational awareness. This level of 
biosurveillance can be accomplished through 
the development of a near real-time, electronic, 
common operating picture of routine and 
emerging acute health problems that can be 
shared at all levels of the public health system.
In response to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive - 21, CDC established a Biosurveillance 
Coordination Unit to lead the development of 
a national strategy and implementation plan for 
next generation biosurveillance capabilities, in 
collaboration with a wide range of public and 
private sector partners. These capabilities will 
demand new tools, methods, and analytical 
abilities to integrate data from multiple sources 
and create more actionable information. 
Other priorities include advancing the 
availability of electronic health information 
across the health system; enhancing global 
capability for early detection and situational 
awareness; developing greater laboratory 
innovation and connectivity to support enhanced 
detection and a more rapid response; and 
enhancing the public health workforce so that 
biosurveillance information can be collected, 
managed, analyzed, and disseminated.
Improving public health workforce surge 
capacity. The cornerstone of effective 
preparedness and response consists of skilled 
personnel with the right expertise and a 
sufficient number of these qualified personnel 
to sustain surge operations during an incident. 
Although some progress has been made to 
build surge capacity (e.g., increased numbers of 
epidemiology staff at state and territorial health 
departments, and increased numbers of CDC 
personnel identified, trained, and medically 
cleared to deploy to an event), improvements in 
surge capacity need to continue.
CDC priorities for ongoing and future TPER-
funded projects include support for public health 
laboratory staff surge capacity, and continued 
expansion of CDC’s pool of trained and available 
responders with expertise in epidemiology, 
emergency communications, informatics, 
emergency management, and other specialties.
Helping vulnerable populations. Successful 
planning and response to public health hazards 
requires protecting the health and safety of 
vulnerable populations6  before, during, and 
after emergencies. Identifying effective strategies 
that provide interventions to protect vulnerable 
populations is an ongoing effort.
To strengthen assistance to vulnerable 
populations, CDC priorities include research 
projects that focus on helping vulnerable 
populations, such as developing an evidence base 
of public health interventions. 
Source: CDC
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An additional priority is ensuring that vulnerable 
population needs are included in CDC response 
planning and exercising. Ethical planning and 
response require meaningful engagement of the 
entire population, particularly those who are 
most vulnerable to the impact of the event, as 
early in the planning process as possible. CDC 
requested that the Ethics Subcommittee of 
the CDC Advisory Commitee to the Director 
develop a white paper examining ethical issues 
and considerations for public health emergency 
preparedness and response. These issues 
include meeting the special needs of vulnerable 
populations in preparedness planning and 
response activities. 
In addition, CDC commissioned five focus 
papers that explore issues related to professional, 
civic, and personal obligations; research in 
emergency settings; vulnerable populations; 
ethical issues relating to stockpiling; and public 
engagement. The white paper and focus papers 
are scheduled to be published in 2009.
Enhancing capabilities for specific public 
health emergency scenarios. CDC must address 
gaps in its response capabilities for specific 
public health emergencies. CDC’s priorities for 
ongoing and future preparedness and response 
projects include expanding key capabilities for 
specific public health emergency scenarios. These 
priorities promote projects that support response 
planning and exercising, particularly for threats 
that have not been included in previous exercises. 
Additional priorities that address scenario-
specific response include improving laboratory 
methods and capabilities for chemical and 
infectious agents, radiological materials, and the 
testing of environmental samples. Priorities also 
include support for improving laboratory surge 
capacity for scenario-specific events, particularly 
for radiation emergencies and environmental 
investigations.
A Continuing Commitment  
to Preparedness
CDC’s investments in preparedness have resulted 
in significant accomplishments, but there is 
much left to do. To have a strong platform for 
rapid and effective public health emergency 
response, CDC will continue to strengthen its 
own internal response capabilities, as well as 
build external response capabilities through its 
financial and/or technical support of partners 
at local, state, tribal, territorial, federal, and 
international levels.
This report builds on the 
analysis of state public health 
preparedness presented in the 
February 2008 CDC report, 
Public Health Preparedness: 
Mobilizing State by State.7 
Future updates from CDC 
will assess the progress in 
preparedness at CDC and at 
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y Public Health Preparedness 
Objectives
Major CDC Preparedness Activities   
and Accomplishments
Health Monitoring and Surveillance
Integrate and enhance the existing surveillance systems at the 
local, state, national, and international levels to detect, monitor, 
report, and evaluate public health threats.
•   Enhancing nationwide surveillance of emerging health threats
•    Providing surveillance tools to state and local epidemiologists for 
detecting potential health threats 
•    Tracking hazardous substances and alerting emergency partners about 
accidental releases
•   Developing tools to conduct surveillance during disasters    
                                                                             See Chapter 2 for details
Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences
Support and strengthen human and technolog ical epidemiologic 
resources to prevent, investigate, mitigate, and control current, 
emerging, and new public health threats and to conduct research 
and development that lead to interventions for such threats.
•   Assessing the vaccine and treatment options for anthrax
•    Developing methods to detect the presence of anthrax in potentially 
contaminated areas
•   Evaluating emergency medicine kits for at-home use
•    Enabling secure and rapid communication to detect health threats
•    Supplementing the epidemiology workforce in states and localities
                                                                              See Chapter 3 for details
Public Health Laboratory Science and Service
Enhance and sustain nationwide and international laboratory 
capacity to gather, ship, screen, and test samples for public 
health threats and to conduct research and development that 
lead to interventions for such threats.
•    Collaborating to detect health threats through laboratory networks 
•   Developing new laboratory methods and refining existing methods
•    Promoting safety and security for entities that possess, use, or transfer 
select agents and toxins 
•   Providing CDC laboratory capability and capacity 
•    Deploying skilled personnel to investigate international health threats
•   Protecting the public and responders during emergencies
                                                                             See Chapter 4 for details
Response and Recovery Operations
Assure an integrated, sustainable, nationwide response and 
recovery capacity to limit morbidity and mortality from public 
health threats.
•    Operating a command center for monitoring and coordinating emergency 
response
•    Planning, training, exercising, and evaluating to improve emergency 
response 
•   Responding to hazardous substance emergencies
•   Ensuring availability of key medical supplies during emergencies
•   Restricting the spread of health threats at U.S. borders
•   Providing risk and emergency communication capabilities 
•   Supporting the protection of vulnerable populations
•    Protecting the health, safety, and resiliency of emergency responders 
during an event
                                                                            See Chapter 5 for details
Public Health System Support
Expand and strengthen integrated, sustained, national, 
foundational and surge capacities capable of reaching all 
individuals with effective assistance to address public health 
threats.
•    Supporting state and local health departments through funding and 
technical assistance
•    Collaborating, training, and providing educational tools to enhance 
preparedness
•   Strengthening legal preparedness for public health emergencies
                                                                            See Chapter 6 for details
Table 1: CDC Public Health Preparedness
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“ Building a strong platform for public health preparedness is no easy endeavor. It requires a commitment to continuously plan, train, and exercise to improve our 
preparedness and response. Much work remains to be done to improve our internal 
and external response capabilities and to reduce our vulnerabilities to all types of 
public health threats. 
Chapter 1:  Public Health Preparedness  
and CDC
Public Health Preparedness
The capability of the public health system, 
communities, and individuals to prevent, 
protect against, quickly respond to, and recover 
from health emergencies, particularly those 
in which scale, timing, or unpredictability 
threatens to overwhelm routine capabilities.11
Source: CDC
Public health threats are always present. Whether caused by diseases, natural disasters, 
or terrorists, there are continual threats that can 
lead to public health emergencies. The effects that 
emergencies have on the well-being of our nation 
are obvious in the aftermath of such events as 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the outbreak of severe 
acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and 
the terrorist attacks of 2001. Being prepared to 
prevent, respond to, and recover rapidly from 
public health threats can save lives and protect 
the health and safety of the public and emergency 
responders. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC)8 plays a key role in preparing 
our nation for all types of threats to public health.9
This report provides an overview of activities 
funded by CDC’s Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response (TPER) federal allocation 
for fiscal year (FY) 2007,10 and some important 
accomplishments that have been made. The report 
also highlights the key challenges that remain 
on the path to achieving CDC’s overarching 
preparedness goal: “People prepared for emerging 
health threats – people in all communities will 
be protected from infectious, occupational, 
environmental, and terrorist threats.” Additional 
funding sources support other CDC preparedness 
“
- Richard E. Besser, MD 
   Director, Coordinating Office for Terrorism        
 Preparedness and Emergency Response
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activities, including those for pandemic influenza 
and environmental health. This report focuses on 
TPER-funded activities, which are a significant part 
of preparedness investments at CDC.
Federal response to public health emergencies. 
The overall responsibility for emergency response 
lies with the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). Since 2001, 21 Homeland 
Security Presidential Directives have been issued. 
These directives have set in motion DHS initiatives, 
including publication of the National Response 
Framework (see box above), establishing a single, 
comprehensive structure for an all-hazards 
approach to domestic incident response. In 
addition, the National Preparedness Guidelines 
provide vision, capabilities, and priorities for 
national preparedness. These two documents 
constitute the core of the nation’s preparedness 
policies.
Under the National Response Framework, the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has the responsibility to coordinate federal 
assistance that supplements state, tribal, and local 
resources in response to public health and medical 
disasters.12 The Assistant Secretary for Preparedness 
and Response (ASPR) is the principal advisor 
to the HHS Secretary on all matters related to 
bioterrorism and other public health emergencies.13 
ASPR works with other federal departments 
and agencies and is charged with the overall 
coordination and oversight functions of emergency 
preparedness and response activities within 
HHS, including activities involving vulnerable 
populations.14 ASPR responsibilities include the 
coordination of activities related to CDC, which 
is an operating division of HHS. CDC executes 
public health response activities.
CDC’s mission and response capabilities. 
CDC’s mission is “to collaborate to create the 
expertise, information, and tools that people and 
communities need to protect their health.” CDC 
achieves this mission by building capabilities that 
can be applied universally to all hazards, whether 
due to biological agents, natural disasters or 
environmental exposures, chemical and radiological 
materials, or explosions (see figure 1). In addition, 
CDC must build capabilities that are scenario-
specific, such as quickly and accurately testing for 
radioactive materials to determine appropriate 
medical treatment following the explosion of a 
dirty bomb (i.e., radiological dispersal device). 
CDC preparedness goals. CDC’s preparedness 
activities address one of the agency’s overarching 
health protection goals: “People prepared 
for emerging health threats – people in all 
communities will be protected from infectious, 
occupational, environmental, and terrorist threats.” 
CDC identified nine outcome goals aimed at 
measuring progress toward this overarching goal 
(see inside front cover).
Coordination of CDC Preparedness Activities
CDC core public health functions and 
preparedness objectives. CDC established five 
objectives that emerge from CDC’s core functions 
to form a foundation for preparedness. The 
National Response Framework
The National Response Framework presents the guiding principles that 
enable all response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national 
response to disasters and emergencies – from the smallest incident to 
the largest catastrophe. The Framework, which replaced the National 
Response Plan in 2008, establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards 
















Figure 1: All-hazards approach maximizes 
available resources.
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Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness 
and Emergency Response (COTPER) was 
established in August 200215 and strategically 
coordinates CDC’s activities to meet the 
following five objectives:
•     Health Monitoring and Surveillance
      Objective: Integrate and enhance the 
existing surveillance systems at the local, 
state, national, and international levels to 
detect, monitor, report, and evaluate public 
health threats.
•    Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences
      Objective: Support and strengthen human 
and technolog ical epidemiologic resources 
to prevent, investigate, mitigate, and 
control current, emerging, and new public 
health threats and to conduct research and 
development that lead to interventions for 
such threats.
•     Public Health Laboratory Science and Service
      Objective: Enhance and sustain nationwide 
and international laboratory capacity to 
gather, ship, screen, and test samples for 
public health threats and to conduct research 
and development that lead to interventions 
for such threats.
•    Response and Recovery Operations
      Objective: Assure an integrated, sustainable, 
nationwide response and recovery capacity 
to limit morbidity and mortality from 
public health threats.
•     Public Health System Support
      Objective: Expand and strengthen 
integrated, sustained, national, foundational 
and surge capacities capable of reaching 
all individuals with effective assistance to 
address public health threats.
COTPER’s role. COTPER is responsible 
for TPER funding that is appropriated by 
Congress, which was approximately $1.5 
billion in FY 2007.16 TPER funding supports a 
range of activities at CDC and state and local 
levels that help develop the building blocks to 
respond to public health threats. Approximately 
90% of this funding is allocated to specific 
preparedness areas (Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness cooperative agreement, Strategic 
National Stockpile, BioSense, Centers for 
Public Health Preparedness, All Other State 
and Local Capacity, Anthrax, Quarantine, Real 
Time Lab Reporting, and Advanced Practice 
Centers). 
COTPER uses the five objectives to set 
priorities for allocating the remaining funds 
to programs across CDC.17 CDC programs 
receiving TPER resources assume responsibility 
for these projects. This coordinated approach 
enables CDC to leverage preparedness 
capabilities and scientific expertise and to 
avoid duplicating strategies and activities.  
See Appendix 2 for more detailed funding 
information.
About This Report
Data in this report come primarily from CDC 
programs and are also supplemented by external 
sources, such as the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists. See Appendix 3 for 
more information about data sources.
The purpose of this report is to provide an 
overview of TPER-funded public health 
activities, specific accomplishments, and the 
challenges faced by CDC as it strives to achieve 
its preparedness goals. The report includes a 
chapter for each of the five core public health 
functions; major activities, accomplishments, 
and challenges are presented within each 
section. This report concludes with a “Moving 
Forward” chapter that describes how COTPER 
is prioritizing future preparedness resources to 
address many of the cross-cutting challenges 
presented in the report.
TPER-funded preparedness activities build 
upon decades of CDC scientific expertise, 
strengthening both CDC’s internal response 
capabilities as well as external response 
capabilities at local, state, tribal, territorial, 
and international levels. This report builds on 
the analysis of state public health preparedness 
presented in the CDC report, Public Health 
Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State.18 Future 
updates from CDC will assess the progress in 
preparedness at CDC and at local, state, tribal, 
territorial, and international levels.
The purpose of this 
report is to provide 





and the challenges 
faced by CDC as it 
strives to achieve its 
preparedness goals. 
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Public health threats come from diverse sources – biological agents, natural disasters, chemical and radiological incidents, or explosions.  The impact of these threats varies and can range from local outbreaks to incidents 
with global ramifications.  Storms and disease outbreaks occur frequently and are usually resolved locally.  In 
contrast, widespread diseases like pandemic influenza outbreaks, multistate outbreaks, major weather events, or 
incidents involving radiological materials require national and sometimes global resources for response.  Some 
of these health threats are intentional, such as bombings and other types of terrorist attacks, and put additional 
demands on preparation and resources.  
Biological agents.  These agents include viruses, bacteria, parasites, and fungi 
(or their toxins) that can cause illness or death in people, animals, or plants and 
are spread through the air, water, or in food.  Dramatic increases in the volume 
and speed of global travel mean that infectious diseases caused by biological 
agents are now spreading faster.  New diseases are constantly emerging, while 
others re-emerge in drug-resistant or other forms that threaten human health.  
A highly infectious and lethal strain of influenza, for example, is now infecting 
millions of birds across Asia, Europe, and Africa.  There is growing concern 
that the causative virus (H5N1) may develop the ability to infect humans 
and spread easily from person to person, causing an influenza pandemic.  Some biological agents may also be 
intentionally released, as happened with the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States. 
Chemical and radiological materials.  Inadvertent or intentional releases 
of chemicals or radiation could create large-scale public health emergencies, 
especially if these releases occurred in densely populated areas.  Chemicals 
and radiological materials are manufactured, transported, stored, and used 
broadly across the United States.  Each year, 1.7 million to 1.8 million carloads 
of hazardous materials are shipped on 170,000 miles of U.S. railway.1  An 
estimated 15,000 industrial plants handle substantial quantities of extremely 
hazardous chemicals, presenting the potential for accidental releases.2  
Radiological releases could have massive health and economic consequences, 
depending on dispersal conditions.  If an improvised nuclear device were 
exploded in a large city, government estimates predict that at least 450,000 people would be displaced or need to 
be evacuated, tens of thousands would require decontamination and both short-term and long-term treatment, 
and the economic impact would be hundreds of billions of dollars.3 
Natural disasters and other environmental exposures.  Natural disasters 
like extended heat waves, severe snow or ice storms, catastrophic hurricanes, 
and extensive floods leave enormous public health, individual, and economic 
burdens in their wake.  These disasters can have multiple effects on health – 
traumatic injuries, mental health effects, or difficulty managing chronic diseases 
because of evacuation or damaged healthcare facilities.  The economic costs also 
are great; natural disasters have cost the United States more than $600 billion in 
a 27-year period (see figure on page 13).     
The Range of Public Health Threats
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The health and economic risks posed by natural disasters could increase in number and severity as the 
earth’s climate changes, causing more precipitation and other weather extremes.  Possible health effects 
resulting from climate change include increases in diseases caused by allergies, respiratory problems, 
illnesses carried by insects or in water, and threats to the safety and availability of our food and water 
supplies.  In addition to the threats from natural disasters, the general public and occupational workers 
are exposed to hundreds of environmental chemicals that enter their bodies and that have shown the 
potential for carcinogenic, reproductive, developmental, and neurologic risk.  
Explosions.  Explosives are the weapon of choice for most 
terrorists.4  Explosions and resulting blast waves can wreak havoc in 
an instant and result in large numbers of casualties with complex 
injuries not commonly seen after natural disasters such as floods or 
hurricanes.  The types of injuries they cause present unique triage, 
diagnostic, and treatment challenges that are unfamiliar to most 
civilian healthcare providers.  Terrorist incidents also increase stress 
and can lead to behavioral changes that result in additional health 
and economic consequences.  
1 Testimony of Joseph H. Boardman, Administrator, Federal Railroad Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, before the Committee on Commerce, 
Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, January 18, 2007.
2 Statement of Thomas P. Dunne, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, before 
the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, United States Senate, June 15, 2005.
3 Planning Scenarios, Executive Summaries, Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, The Homeland 
Security Council,  David Howe, Senior Director for Response and Planning, July 2004.
4 Institute of Medicine. The Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System: Emergency Medical Services at the Crossroads. Washington DC:  
The National Academies Press; 2006. Available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11629.
BILLION-DOLLAR CLIMATE AND WEATHER DISASTERS BY STATE, 1980–2007*
* The national map by state summarizes each billion-dollar event for each state affected—i.e., it does not 
mean that each state shown suffered at least $1 billion in losses for each event. For example, an event 
causing $1 billion in overall US damages spread over 5 states would cause well under $1 billion in dam-
age in each affected state. However, larger multibillion-dollar events would sometimes cause more than 
$1 billion in damages in one or more states.
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fl oods 13 63
Heat waves/
droughts 13 178




Ice storms 2 6
Nor’easter 1 2
Total 78 641
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Chapter 2: Health Monitoring 
and Surveillance
Quickly recognizing and assessing the causes of health threats are crucial to protecting the 
American public. Public health officials rely on 
accurate and complete data to detect and estimate 
the effect of threats and determine the spread of 
illness. Public health surveillance – the ongoing, 
systematic collection, analysis, interpretation, and 
dissemination of data about a health-related  
event – is conducted to protect the public and 
improve health. Surveillance for public health 
emergencies must occur locally by public health 
professionals. 
CDC’s health monitoring and surveillance 
preparedness objective is to integrate and enhance 
the existing surveillance systems at local, state, 
national, and international levels to detect, monitor, 
report, and evaluate public health threats. TPER 
activities in this area consisted of six projects in 
three of CDC’s major offices and centers. FY 2007 
funding for activities supporting this objective 
was more than $50 million, with more than 90% 
allocated to BioSense. 
Major CDC activities and accomplishments that 
focus on achieving the public health monitoring 
and surveillance objective include:
Enhancing nationwide surveillance of emerging •	
health threats through BioSense and the 
National Poison Data System,
Providing surveillance tools to state and local •	
epidemiologists for detecting potential health 
threats,
Tracking hazardous substances and alerting •	
emergency partners about accidental releases, 
and
Developing tools to conduct surveillance during •	
disasters.
Enhancing nationwide surveillance of emerging 
health threats through BioSense and the 
National Poison Data System. Infectious disease 
threats, natural disasters, and potential terrorist 
attacks demonstrate that the United States needs 
surveillance capability that provides a real-time, 
national picture of emerging health threats. Early 
identification of potential threats allows for earlier 
responses. For example, to respond effectively 
during the influenza season we need to know the 
timing of the onset of illness, how it is spreading 
across the country, and which influenza virus strains 
are causing illness. Two of the tools supporting 
CDC efforts to create a real-time picture for 
surveillance are BioSense and the National Poison 
Data System. 
BioSense. CDC developed the BioSense system to 
receive and share real-time data from healthcare 
organizations, including hospitals, clinical 
laboratories, and outpatient facilities. As part of a 
national strategy for biosurveillance, BioSense has 
the potential for improved recognition and response 
to a wide range of public health threats. BioSense 
began displaying near real-time hospital data in 
2006. 
As of September 30, 2007, more than 460 
hospitals and more than 1,500 federal military 
and veterans’ outpatient facilities covering all 50 
states transmitted near real-time data to BioSense. 
The Laboratory Corporation of America, which 
tests approximately 400,000 samples daily, also 
transmitted data on a daily basis. A team of CDC 
staff analyze and display the data on a secure 
Internet-based application within 2 hours of 
receipt. These reports are provided to the CDC 
Director’s Emergency Operations Center (see page 
31) and local, state, and private entities, enabling 
immediate, critical decision making to identify and 
control the spread of health threats.
In FY 2007, BioSense provided situational 
awareness during events such as the Super Bowl 
and the State of the Union Address. In addition, 
BioSense detected data anomalies of potential 
public health importance in a variety of incidents 
during 2007, including:
An outbreak of gastrointestinal disease at a •	
U.S. Department of Defense base caused by a 
norovirus,
Rash illness among elementary school students,•	
Multiple spikes in heat-related illness in •	
metropolitan areas, and
Respiratory problems associated with the •	






is to integrate and 
enhance the existing 
surveillance systems 
at local, state, national, 
and international levels 
to detect, monitor, 
report, and evaluate 
public health threats.
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BioSense: A Useful Tool During California Wildfires
In the fall of 2007, devastating southern California wildfires 
provided a unique opportunity to use BioSense. About 20 
million people living in the Los Angeles, San Diego, and 
surrounding areas were affected by this massive event.
While the fires were burning, the CDC BioIntelligence 
Center provided California and San Diego County public 
health officials with daily reports of health activity related 
to the wildfires. The BioSense system noted large increases 
in respiratory visits to hospitals for respiratory conditions, 
especially visits for asthma and dyspnea (difficulty in 
breathing/shortness of breath), as well as increases in total 
visits. California and San Diego County public health officials 
found the BioSense information to be a useful addition to 
their surveillance efforts because it facilitated their ability 
to quickly and automatically assess the adequacy of their 
response. In the event that there had been a greater increase in respiratory diseases or increases in 
infectious diseases or injuries, local authorities would have been better equipped to design and 
deploy further public health measures as a result of the BioSense reports. Lessons learned from 
this experience will help not only the next time wildfires strike, but in other large-scale exposures 
to environmental hazards. [For more information see Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 
2008;57(27):741-7.]
National Poison Data System. CDC supports the 
American Association of Poison Control Centers 
in collecting national data on toxic exposures 
through the National Poison Data System 
(NPDS). Annually, poison control centers receive 
more than 2 million calls from the general public 
and healthcare providers seeking expert advice. 
Poison control centers submit data to the system 
every 4 minutes to 10 minutes. Currently, CDC 
epidemiologists and toxicologists review these 
data and can quickly detect and alert public 
health officials of chemical or toxin exposures, 
both unintentional and intentional (e.g., 
deliberate poisoning of food or water). 
In FY 2007, CDC used this system to monitor 
the outbreak of melamine in pet food and 
toothpaste. CDC tracked the outbreak and 
alerted the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
about severity of cases and geographic extent of 
the outbreak, enhancing government response. 
CDC also staged mock events evaluating the 
system, which performed successfully in these 
nationwide drills as well as in events staged 
by poison centers in California and Texas. 
As a result of the real-life and mock events, 
CDC determined that NPDS is an important 
component of the national capacity to mount 
effective public health response to intentional 
and unintentional chemical exposures and 
poisonings.
Providing surveillance tools to state and 
local epidemiologists for detecting potential 
health threats. CDC provides surveillance tools, 
such as the Early Aberration Reporting System 
(EARS), to help state and local epidemiologists 
improve health threat detection. This system is 
accessible on CDC’s website at no cost for use 
by city, county, state, federal, and international 
public health officials; the system allows users to 
analyze data for unusual spikes from sources such 
as emergency departments, 911 calls, physician 
offices, and over-the-counter drug sales. In 2007, 
approximately 100 organizations used the system 
(see box on page 17). CDC continues to improve 
communications and facilitate knowledge 
exchange among EARS users and advance the 
science of how to detect aberrations in health 
data. Early detection should translate to earlier 
response, thereby preventing illness and saving 
lives.  
Tracking hazardous substances and alerting 
emergency partners about accidental releases. 
CDC has cooperative agreements with 14 states 
to collect data on hazardous substance releases 
and track subsequent health effects through the 
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events 
NASA Aqua satellite image from 705 km above 
California’s wildfires. (Source: NASA)
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Surveillance Tool in North Carolina Impacts Future  
Warnings about Heat Waves
During a 2007 heat wave, North Carolina public health officials used their surveillance system, which 
uses the Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS), to track heat-related visits to hospital emergency 
departments. What they found led them to modify their warnings during future heat waves.
The North Carolina Disease Event Tracking and Epidemiologic Collection Tool (NC-DETECT), which 
is funded by the state and CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement and 
BioSense, tracks emergency department patient visits and Carolinas Poison Center calls to monitor 
public health and environmental health threats. Although it is usually used to track communicable 
disease, it can also be programmed to look for symptoms of other kinds of illnesses, including heat-
related illnesses. During the heat wave, NC-DETECT found an average of 84 heat-related emergency 
department visits per day, more than seven times the average before the heat wave. The peak day 
brought 150 visits.
The surveillance system provided some surprising results. The state usually issues heat-related warnings 
that focus on the very young and the very old. NC-DETECT found 15- to 19-year-olds and 25- to 44-
year-olds had the highest rate of heat-related emergency department visits during the heat wave. Public 
health officials suspect that the overheating probably occurred as a result of exertion during outdoor 
work or exercise. In the future, North Carolina public health officials will target these groups to alert 
them of the dangers from excessive heat.
Surveillance (HSEES) program. The program allows 
CDC and state public health officials to assess 
vulnerabilities and proactively plan for prevention 
and timely response. 
HSEES is used to:
Identify high risk chemicals, industries, and •	
locations for local and state emergency planners 
(e.g., regional hazardous materials teams),
Alert state and local response agencies to handle •	
emergencies, and
Provide scenarios for emergency event planning •	
and drills. 
In FY 2007, there were 7,130 instances of hazardous 
substance releases in the 14 participating states. For 
the releases that were potentially dangerous –  
including a chlorine leak in a Florida water 
treatment facility and the largest oil spill in 
Wisconsin history – the system provided more 
than 1,600 alerts to emergency partners in these 
states. Of the 7,130 incidents, 501 led to an ordered 
evacuation, with a total of 35,094 people evacuated. 
Source: NC DETECT and State Climate Office of North Carolina
Number of Emergency Department Visits Related to Heat Exposure; May – August 2007
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Developing tools to conduct surveillance during 
disasters. Working with several public health 
partners (including the Florida, Georgia, Texas, and 
North Carolina health departments; the American 
Red Cross; and the National Disaster Medical 
System19), CDC developed tools to improve 
surveillance data obtained during disasters. These 
data are critical for describing the distribution 
of injuries and illnesses, rapidly detecting 
outbreaks in evacuation shelters, communicating 
with public health partners, and implementing 
timely interventions. In previous disasters, such 
as Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, responders did 
not have tools to collect standard information 
to coordinate surveillance across local, state, and 
federal levels.
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments that support 
surveillance during disasters included:
Developing a standard, field-tested form for •	
collecting data from healthcare facilities and 
evacuation shelters;
Implementing electronic methods for data •	
collection in the field (e.g., on a personal digital 
assistant or through scannable forms);
Developing a toolkit for collecting common •	
data elements regarding mental/behavioral 
surveillance including needs assessments and 
survey forms; and
Conducting a pilot study of the data analysis •	
tools in an emergency department setting in 
collaboration with the Georgia Division of 
Public Health.
CDC is continuing to improve disaster surveillance 
by evaluating and revising the disaster surveillance 
materials based on the pilot study in Georgia, 
developing interactive online forms for disaster 
surveillance, and providing more information on 
injuries, worker health, and mental health.
Challenges for Health Monitoring and 
Surveillance
Implementing the next generation of 
surveillance systems. Historically, public health 
surveillance was conducted through paper systems 
before evolving to computerized systems. Despite 
improved technologies, these systems today remain 
fragmented and slow in exchanging information 
between clinical care providers and public health 
authorities. In some cases, surveillance systems 
collect data from a limited number of states, not 
allowing for a nationwide picture. (e.g., HSEES 
collects data from only 14 states), or need to 
provide additional data (e.g., BioSense). This 
presents a challenge in ensuring a coordinated, 
comprehensive nationwide capability for real-
time surveillance. Increasing critical information 
available to decision makers during an emergency 
(i.e., enhancing situational awareness) is essential. 
CDC is taking steps to enhance BioSense data 
available to decision makers. Collaborating with 
stakeholders, partners, and customers, CDC has 
outlined a redesign of the BioSense program, 
which includes the use of federated database 
technologies20 to allow states and jurisdictions to 
see across borders using BioSense technologies 
and determine if local conditions are part of a 
larger regional situation. Future plans for BioSense 
also include the expansion of available case 
detection technologies so that clinical data can be 
automatically analyzed to detect cases or possible 
cases of infectious diseases. Incentives will also be 
increased for clinical care providers to provide real-
time data to public health authorities. 
Enhancing surveillance of long-term health 
effects. The long-term health effects of disasters 
are not fully understood. Certain disasters, such 
as those related to radiation, have health effects 
that may not emerge for many years. Current 
surveillance systems do not capture health 
information to clarify the long-term effects of 
radiation, such as the level of contamination and 
whether contamination was internal or external.21 
To begin this process, CDC convened a meeting 
of national and international experts in November 
2008 to collaborate on developing guidelines 
for establishing registries for disasters and other 
emergency events. 

Implementing next-generation surveillance systems 
and enhancing surveillance of long-term health 
effects are among the many issues contributing 
to the broader challenge of having integrated 
biosurveillance systems and activities. For more 
information about the broader, cross-cutting 
challenges that CDC faces and priorities to address 
these challenges, see Chapter 7, “Moving Forward,” 
on page 47.
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Chapter 3: Epidemiology and Other 
Assessment Sciences
Applied epidemiology is the science of conducting investigations to determine 
the cause and breadth of public health 
problems, including those caused by 
emergencies. CDC continues to focus on 
developing faster and more accurate methods 
of disease investigation to control the spread 
of public health threats. Other assessment 
sciences refer to a broad group of disciplines 
involved in research to understand and predict 
how demographic, behavioral, cultural, 
and environmental factors influence health. 
Research activities can include developing 
effective interventions and assessing how best 
to provide health information to the public.
CDC’s preparedness objective for epidemiology 
and other assessment sciences is to support 
and strengthen human and technolog ical 
epidemiologic resources to prevent, investigate, 
mitigate, and control current, emerging, and 
new public health threats and to conduct 
research and development that lead to 
interventions for such threats. TPER activities 
in this area consisted of 12 projects in 7 of 
CDC’s major offices and centers. FY 2007 
funding for activities supporting this objective 
was more than $20 million; the major category 
of investment in this area included research 
assessing the safety and effectiveness of the 
U.S. licensed anthrax vaccine. 
Major CDC activities and accomplishments 
that focus on achieving the epidemiology and 
other assessment sciences objective include:
Assessing the vaccine and treatment options •	
for anthrax,
Developing methods to detect the presence •	
of anthrax in potentially contaminated 
areas,
Evaluating emergency medicine kits for •	
at-home use,
Enabling secure and rapid communication •	
to detect health threats, and
Supplementing the epidemiology workforce •	
in states and localities.
Assessing the vaccine and treatment options 
for anthrax. Through clinical trials and 
research, CDC is assessing use of the only 
licensed anthrax vaccine in the United States, 
called anthrax vaccine adsorbed (AVA), or 
BioThrax. The focus of this work is a large 
clinical trial evaluating whether changing the 
route of vaccine administration22 and reducing 
the number of primary doses in the vaccination 
series will lead to fewer side effects while 
maintaining effectiveness. In addition, primate 
studies are being conducted to determine 
the factors associated with protection against 
anthrax; these studies have already informed 
future improvements to second-generation 
anthrax vaccines.
During the 2001 anthrax bioterrorism attack, 
5 of 11 patients (45%) with inhalation anthrax 
died, despite use of modern intensive care 
units and antibiotics. To reduce the mortality 
of future inhalation anthrax patients, CDC 
is researching the effectiveness of a serum 
containing anthrax antibodies (anthrax 
immune globulin or AIG) to assess its 
usefulness as a treatment option for severe 
anthrax disease and its possible effectiveness in 
preventing anthrax infection. 
Developing methods to detect the presence 
of anthrax in potentially contaminated 
areas. During the anthrax investigations of 
2001, CDC collected samples from potentially 
contaminated areas. CDC sampled areas 
where anthrax would most likely be found to 
quickly identify contamination. This strategy 
supported public health measures, such as 
decisions about whether to provide antibiotics. 
However, CDC could not definitively conclude 
if the entire area was safe. 
Since even low levels of anthrax could harm 
susceptible individuals (see box on page 20), 
CDC developed a new sampling strategy to 
more definitively conclude that areas are not 
contaminated. The strategy has been field 
tested and will continue to be refined. The U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency plans to use 










resources to prevent, 
investigate, mitigate, 
and control current, 
emerging, and 
new public health 
threats and to 
conduct research and 
development that 
lead to interventions 
for such threats. 
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Evaluating emergency medicine kits for at-
home use. In partnership with the Missouri 
Department of Health and Senior Services, CDC 
evaluated a strategy to provide an emergency 
MedKit containing antibiotics for families to keep 
in their homes should a release of anthrax occur. 
CDC, with U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
approval, designed the MedKit prototype, which 
consisted of a five-day supply of medicine and 
instructions for use. An overwhelming majority of 
study participants followed instructions regarding 
storage and reserving the emergency MedKit 
for appropriate use. A similarly large proportion 
of participants reported that they would like to 
have emergency MedKits and would be willing 
to purchase them. The MedKit prototype is 
currently undergoing additional testing before 
being licensed for use.23
Enabling secure and rapid communication to 
detect health threats. Since December 2000, 
CDC’s Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) 
has enabled rapid detection of health threats. 
Epi-X can help ensure that local problems are 
contained and national events are detected sooner. 
Epi-X is a secure, web-based communication 
system that allows CDC officials, state and local 
health departments, poison control centers, and 
other public health professionals to quickly and 
securely share preliminary health surveillance 
information. Through Epi-X, users report 
outbreaks and other public health events to CDC 
and receive notifications about developing health 
threats through daily electronic summaries. When 
needed, users receive immediate emergency 
notification via e-mail, pager, “land line” phone, 
or cell phone.
In FY 2007, Epi-X alerted health officials about 
incidents including:
An outbreak of •	 Salmonella infections caused 
by peanut butter;
Foodborne botulism in Texas, Indiana, and •	
California;
Travel-related measles in multiple states and •	
Canada; and
An outbreak among military personnel of a •	
rare type of adenovirus that can cause severe 
and sometimes fatal respiratory illness.
Supplementing the epidemiology workforce in 
states and localities. Epidemiologists detect and 
investigate health threats and disease patterns. 
Ongoing shortages in the epidemiology workforce 
can affect the ability to effectively respond during 
an emergency. A 2006 Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists assessment indicated 
that 2,502 epidemiologists were working in state 
and territorial health departments. An estimated 
34% increase in the number of epidemiologists 
was needed at that time to carry out essential 
functions.24 Both CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence 
Service and the Career Epidemiology Field 
Officer program supplement the epidemiology 
workforce. 
Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS). The EIS 
program expands the epidemiology workforce 
through a two-year epidemiology training 
program modeled on a traditional medical 
fellowship. EIS officers serve as a critical 
component of CDC’s response to routine public 
health incidents and large-scale national 
Focus on Anthrax
Anthrax, caused by infection with Bacillus anthracis, is a serious disease that occurs naturally in 
animals and can be deadly to humans. Bacillus anthracis has significant potential to be used as a 
bioterrorist agent because it forms spores, which can survive in the environment for several years. 
Fatality rates from anthrax depend on whether infection is through the skin (cutaneous anthrax), 
digestive system, or respiratory system (inhalation anthrax); early treatment of all forms is important 
for recovery. Fatality rates range from less than 1% for cutaneous anthrax 
treated with antibiotics to approximately 75% for inhalation anthrax, 
even with all possible supportive care including appropriate antibiotics. 
If an anthrax threat is recognized quickly, people who may have been 
exposed can receive antibiotics and a vaccine to prevent onset of the 
disease. There is no screening test for anthrax that indicates whether a 
person has been exposed to or has the disease. The only way exposure can 
be determined is through a public health investigation and laboratory 
tests.
Bacillus anthracis (Source: CDC)
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CDC’s Epidemic Intelligence Service in Action:  
Investigating a Salmonella Outbreak
In February 2007, two Salmonella cases with identical DNA patterns were 
identified in Pennsylvania through routine electronic laboratory reporting. 
Salmonella bacteria, which can cause diarrhea, fever, and abdominal 
cramps, are responsible for an estimated 1.4 million illnesses in the United 
States every year.
To prevent the disease from spreading further, the CDC Epidemic 
Intelligence Service officer assigned to the Pennsylvania Department of 
Health worked with other investigators to determine the outbreak source. 
Using a variety of methods, the group identified 29 more Salmonella cases 
from five counties. Interviews with these patients revealed that each had 
consumed raw (unpasteurized) milk or milk products from the same dairy. 
After isolating the Salmonella outbreak strain from raw milk at the dairy as 
well as from two of the patients’ households, investigators confirmed the 
dairy as the outbreak source. Consequently, the state revoked the dairy’s 
raw milk permit, and legislators reviewed the regulation of dairies that 
sell raw milk. [For more information see Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report 2007;56(44):1161-4.]
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Health
emergencies. EIS officers assigned to CDC in Atlanta 
responded to 68 requests for assistance through the 
formal EPI-AID mechanism.25
CDC also places EIS officers in state and local health 
departments. In FY 2007, 10 new TPER-funded 
officers were placed, for a total of 26 officers in state 
and local health departments. During FY 2007, 
field EIS officers assigned to state or local health 
departments conducted 395 epidemiologic field 
investigations in 43 states and three other countries, 
including 26 multistate investigations.
In FY 2007, EIS officer contributions to public health 
responses included:
Responding to a multistate measles outbreak •	
associated with an international youth sporting 
event;
Investigating a multistate outbreak of •	 E. coli 
O157:H7 infections associated with frozen pizza; 
Determining the source of a •	 Salmonella oubreak 
in Pennsylvania (see box above); and
Investigating two cases of swine influenza in •	
children, resulting in collaboration between 
CDC, Iowa Department of Public Health, Iowa’s 
state veterinarian, and the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture in Iowa. 
Career Epidemiology Field Officer (CEFO) Program. 
CDC places experienced epidemiologists in state and 
local public health departments through the CEFO 
program. These epidemiologists enhance state and 
local response efforts for public health emergencies 
and function as liaisons and consultants between 
CDC and public health departments. Members of 
the CEFO program have led innovative pandemic 
influenza planning and response efforts in their 
assigned jurisdictions. As of September 30, 2007, 23 
CEFOs were located in 18 states and 1 U.S. territory, 
an increase from 12 CEFOs in FY 2003.
In FY 2007, examples of CEFOs contributions to 
preparedness included:
Planning for avian influenza in Pennsylvania in •	
partnership with the poultry industry, universities, 
and federal and state health and agricultural 
agencies;
Emergency response planning on the Wind River •	
Indian Reservation in Wyoming through training, 
interagency coordination, exercises, and outbreak 
investigations; and
Responding to a botulism outbreak. •	
Challenges for Epidemiology and 
Other Assessment Services
Enhancing research. Although CDC is continually 
working to enhance its ability to prevent, prepare 
for, investigate, mitigate, and control public health 
threats, a number of priority areas for research still 
remain unmet. 
 
22 Public Health Preparedness:
























These areas include the following: 
Current recommendations for antimicrobial •	
use during a deliberate release of several 
infectious threats, such as plague and anthrax, 
are based on limited knowledge with few 
published trials. Additional studies are 
needed to validate the effectiveness of current 
medicines and medical supplies for use 
against infectious agents.
Further evaluation of screening guidelines •	
is needed to maximize the sensitivity and 
specificity of these guidelines, which are used 
by healthcare professionals to determine if 
patients have been exposed to bioterrorism 
agents. CDC needs to increase physicians’ 
and other healthcare professionals’ awareness 
to accurately diagnose suspected cases of 
bioterrorism agent illnesses.
The relative effectiveness of personal •	
protective equipment in preventing the 
transmission of some infectious agents such 
as anthrax and plague is unknown. Research 
is needed to improve the proper selection and 
use of this equipment for first responders. 
Assisting vulnerable populations. Information 
is incomplete on the optimal strategies for 
interventions to protect vulnerable populations26 
during emergencies. Additional research on 
vulnerable populations and community resilience 
is needed to identify preventive factors for disease 
spread; social deterioration; and injury, violence, 
and death related to human migration and global 
mobility. Strategies are particularly important 
to address interventions for children (see box 
below) who are vulnerable to disease and injury 
following emergencies.
Increasing the epidemiology and assessment 
sciences workforce. Additional epidemiologists 
and assessment sciences professionals would 
further improve the nation’s ability to conduct 
disease investigations at the local, state, and 
federal levels. The need for these workers is 
anticipated to only increase. For example, as the 
likelihood of natural disasters and environmental 
emergencies increases as climate change occurs, 
there is a need for more environmental health 
personnel at the state and local levels. Staff 
also need training to ensure they are ready to 
respond to public health emergencies. Data 
and surveillance systems, no matter how 
sophisticated, are not enough. Human judgment 
and expertise are key to effective preparedness 
and response. 
Managing and enhancing data effectively 
during an emergency. During a public health 
emergency, no standard system exists to collect, 
manage, and link data to identify, investigate, 
analyze, monitor, and respond to the threat. 
This makes it difficult to analyze data from an 
investigation involving multiple jurisdictions and 
multiple areas of expertise, such as epidemiology 
and laboratory science. 
To help address this challenge, CDC is 
enhancing the Outbreak Management System 
(OMS), a standardized informatics tool designed 
to assist public health professionals at local, state, 
and federal levels manage disease investigations. 
CDC plans to implement OMS for selected 
state and local jurisdictions in the field and at 
CDC and to incorporate recommendations from 
internal and external stakeholders. 

Most of the challenges for epidemiology and 
other assessment sciences contribute to broader 
issues that cut across CDC’s core public health 
functions. Assisting vulnerable populations 
effectively and having sufficient numbers of 
trained staff are challenges that are faced within 
epidemiology in addition to other core public 
health functions. Managing and enhancing data 
effectively during an emergency is one of many 
issues contributing to the broader challenge 
of having integrated biosurveillance systems 
and activities. For more information about the 
broader, cross-cutting challenges that CDC faces 
and priorities to address these challenges, see 
Chapter 7, “Moving Forward,” on page 47.
Children and Emergencies
“Children have important physical, physiologic, 
developmental, and mental differences from 
adults that can and must be anticipated in the 
disaster planning process. Plans must ensure that 
healthcare facilities and medical providers are 
prepared to meet the medical needs of children of 
all ages and developmental stages.”
Source: The Youngest Victims: Disaster Preparedness to Meet Children’s Needs. 
American Academy of Pediatrics Disaster Preparedness Advisory Council. 
(Available at www.aap.org/disasters/pdf/Youngest-Victims-Final.pdf )
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Chapter 4: Public Health Laboratory 
Science and Service
CDC conducts extensive work in laboratory research and investigations, workforce 
development, support services, and support to 
laboratory partners. Public health laboratories are 
critical in identifying disease agents, toxins, and 
other health threats found in tissue, food, or other 
substances. Rapid detection is essential for the 
implementation of appropriate control measures. 
Detecting and characterizing health threats in 
a timely manner depends on the availability of 
laboratory resources (including personnel), methods, 
and quick and accurate data exchange systems.
CDC’s public health laboratory science and 
service preparedness objective is to enhance and 
sustain nationwide and international laboratory 
capacity to gather, ship, screen, and test samples for 
public health threats and to conduct research and 
development that lead to interventions for such 
threats. TPER activities in this area consisted of 42 
projects in 6 of CDC’s major offices and centers. FY 
2007 funding for activities supporting this objective 
was more than $70 million, not including state 
and local Laboratory Response Network (LRN) 
funding received from the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness cooperative agreement. Major 
categories of investment in this area include LRN 
support and developing and refining laboratory 
methods. 
Key CDC activities and accomplishments that focus 
on achieving the public health laboratory science 
and service objective include:
Collaborating to detect health threats through •	
laboratory networks;
Developing new laboratory methods and •	
refining existing methods;
Promoting safety and security for entities that •	
possess, use, or transfer select agents and toxins;
Providing CDC capability and capacity for •	
laboratory testing of biological and chemical 
agents;
Deploying skilled personnel to investigate •	
international health threats; and
Protecting the public and responders during •	
emergencies.
Figure 2: U.S. Population Within 100 Miles of an LRN Laboratory; 2007
 Source: CDC
CDC’s public health 
laboratory science and 
service preparedness 





to gather, ship, 
screen, and test 
samples for public 
health threats and to 
conduct research and 
development that 
lead to interventions 
for such threats.
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Collaborating to detect health threats through 
laboratory networks. CDC manages the LRN, 
a national network of local, state, federal, and 
international laboratories (see box below). The LRN 
was established in 1999 to create national laboratory 
capacity for biological agents; a chemical testing 
component was added in 2003.27 In 2007, there were 
163 member laboratories capable of testing biological 
agents and 62 LRN laboratories that could test for  
and/or handle chemical agents. LRN is a critical public 
health laboratory infrastructure to detect, characterize, 
and communicate about confirmed threat agents. In 
2007, 90% of the U.S. population lived within 100 
miles of an LRN lab, decreasing the time needed to 
begin the response to a terrorist attack or naturally 
occurring outbreak (see figure 2 on page 23).   
LRN member laboratories perform standardized 
tests yielding reliable results within hours. Recent 
advancements in emergency procedures allow CDC to 
produce enough materials (DNA reagents) in less than 
a week to enable LRN laboratories to perform 500,000 
tests using novel, real-time DNA-based methods. 
To decrease the time needed to detect and respond 
to public health threats, LRN Real Time Laboratory 
Information Exchange equips LRN laboratories to 
securely share data with public health partners in real 
time.  
CDC is working with public health laboratories in 
states, territories, cities, and counties to assist them 
in expanding their chemical laboratory capacity to 
prepare and respond to chemical terrorism incidents or 
other emergencies involving chemicals. CDC provides 
extensive training, technology transfer, and testing for 
analytical proficiency for all participating laboratories. 
In FY 2007, staff trained 84 LRN laboratories via 
hands-on training classes and e-learning and computer-
based training. In addition, CDC coordinated the 
purchase and installation of high throughput analytical 
capability in the 10 laboratories that provide CDC 
with surge capacity.













LRN structure for  
biological laboratories
CDC Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
LRN structure for  
chemical laboratories  
Biological laboratories
Sentinel laboratories•	  consist primarily of hospital-based, clinical institutions, 
and commercial diagnostic laboratories. These laboratories can test samples 
to determine whether the samples should be shipped to reference or 
national laboratories for further testing.
Reference laboratories•	  perform tests to detect and confirm the presence of a 
threat agent. In 2007, 90% of the U.S. population lived within 100 miles 
of a reference laboratory, enabling emergency responders across the country 
to act quickly to mitigate the effects of a potential biological attack or 
outbreak, rather than having to ship samples to CDC.
National laboratories•	 , including those at CDC, have the unique resources 
to handle highly infectious agents and the ability to identify specific agent 
strains.
Chemical laboratories
 Level 3 laboratories•	  work with hospitals and other first responders within 
their jurisdictions to maintain competency in clinical specimen collections, 
storage, and shipment. These laboratories ship samples primarily to CDC. 
Level 3 laboratories also have the option of shipping samples to a Level 2 or 
a Level 1 laboratory that has shown proficiency in a particular method that 
is needed, if the agent is known.
Level 2 laboratories•	  can test for a limited panel of toxic chemical agents, in 
addition to maintaining the competencies of Level 3 laboratories.
Level 1 laboratories•	  are surge capacity laboratories that can test for an 
expanded number of agents, including nerve agents, mustard agents, and 
toxic industrial chemicals, in addition to maintaining the competencies of 
Level 2 and Level 3 laboratories.
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As a result, analytical capability in the LRN has 
increased from 24 to 38 chemical terrorism agents. 
CDC also partners with the Association of Public 
Health Laboratories to ensure support for public 
health laboratories involved in responding to 
chemical-exposure events from all sources, including 
those related to terrorism. 
CDC works with a global laboratory network as 
part of the Global Health Security Action Group, 
established in November 2001 to coordinate 
responses to acts of biological or chemical terrorism. 
Member countries are the United States, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and the 
United Kingdom. This global laboratory network 
coordinates communications, laboratory testing, 
proficiency testing, safety, sample transport, and 
other laboratory activities related to diagnosis of 
potential bioterrorist agents. In FY 2007, the group 
conducted an exercise to demonstrate the capability 
of member countries to ship a potential smallpox 
specimen to CDC. The exercise provided valuable 
information that was used to improve systems 
supporting a global response to bioterrorism. 
Developing new laboratory methods and refining 
existing methods. CDC is developing laboratory 
tests to more quickly and accurately identify health 
threats, including naturally occurring diseases, 
biological threat agents, and dangerous toxins. 
Some tests allow more rapid identification (e.g., 
a new DNA-based method to identify biological 
threat agents in clinical samples), while others allow 
more detailed characterization of the health threat 
(see box on page 26). Public health and other first 
responders must know what the threat is during an 
emergency to take effective action. 
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments supporting 
the development or refinement of laboratory 
methods included:
Developing methods and maintaining readiness •	
for identifying chemical agents. This allows CDC 
to respond more quickly and effectively to 
emergencies involving chemical warfare agents. 
In FY 2007, CDC developed new methods 
for identifying chemical agents (neosaxitoxin, 
volatile organic compounds in blood, and the 
sesqui- and oxymustards). CDC completed 
proficiency testing for multiple chemical agents 
such as cyanide, nitrogen mustards, nerve agent 
metabolites, ricinine, and toxic metals.
Mapping the DNA of biological agents.•	  Rapidly 
assessing the DNA of suspect disease strains 
allows CDC to better respond to bioterrorism 
threats deliberately engineered to evade usual 
testing methods. Clues may be present in 
the organism’s DNA regarding where it came 
from and whether it is resistant to vaccines or 
antibiotics. In FY 2007, CDC mapped DNA of 
the vaccinia virus, which is similar to smallpox, 
and of tularemia bacteria. CDC also expanded 
its capability to perform real-time DNA tests 
to detect the viruses that cause smallpox, 
monkeypox, and related diseases.
Developing methods to detect toxins. •	 Toxic 
chemicals can pose a threat to the public health 
of the United States. CDC is regularly refining 
priorities for chemical response capabilities based 
on information from intelligence, military, and 
law enforcement agencies. In 2007, CDC filled 
critical gaps in its response capability related 
to chemical terrorism by developing methods 
for analyzing and measuring metabolites of 
total mustards, fluoroacetate, chloropicrin, 
neosaxitoxin, tetranitromethane, and phosgene. 
In FY 2007, CDC developed methods to 
differentiate among different types of botulinum 
toxin and to process samples at the rate of 500 
per day. Rapid identification of toxins allows for 
more accurate diagnosis and faster treatment and 
can mean the difference between life and death. 
This and continuing work will allow CDC to 
improve vaccines, to diagnose illness, and to 
treat people exposed to toxins. CDC has also 
developed a rapid test for botulism, decreasing 
testing time from more than 5 days to less than 
24 hours. CDC hopes to transfer this technology 
to the LRN in the near future.
CDC scientist examines the results of a DNA test.
Source: CDC
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CDC Uses DNA Fingerprinting to Identify  
the Source of Outbreaks
DNA “fingerprinting” tests (using pulsed-field gel 
electrophoresis) can provide a unique pattern for different 
strains of isolates. This process can frequently provide clues 
about the geographic origin of a strain or whether a strain is 
common or rare, helping to determine if biological threats 
or disease outbreaks occurred naturally or as a result of an 
attack. Differentiating between a natural and an intentional 
event is a critical component of effective response to a 
bioterrorist attack. CDC works with federal, state, and 
local public health laboratories to use the DNA fingerprints 
to detect health threats nationwide from both foodborne 
diseases and other biological agents. In 2007, the efficiency 
of DNA fingerprints was demonstrated in several high profile botulism cases.
CDC coordinates PulseNet, a national network of 
laboratories at state health departments, local health 
departments, and federal agencies. PulseNet is on the alert 
for both common bacteria that cause disease outbreaks 
(e.g., Salmonella), as well as agents that can be used 
in a bioterrorist attack through the food supply (e.g., 
Francisella). PulseNet member laboratories submit DNA 
fingerprints electronically to a dynamic database at CDC, 
which is available to members for rapid comparison of 
patterns to evaluate if outbreaks are natural or intentional 
and help trace outbreaks to the source. For example, 
PulseNet identified spinach and lettuce as the vehicles for 
serious outbreaks of E. coli 0157 in fall 2006. In an outbreak setting where speed matters, the 
linkage of spinach to E. coli cases led to a product recall by U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
that prevented future illnesses and possibly saved lives. [For more information see Morbidity 
and Mortality Weekly Report 2006;55(38):1045-6.] CDC is working to expand the system in the 
PulseNet database to establish links between human or environmental samples of the agents that 
cause plague and tularemia.
Source: CDC
E. coli  (Source: CDC)
Developing methods to detect plague and •	
tularemia. CDC developed blood tests to 
see if someone has contracted plague, rapid 
tests (polymerase chain reaction) to identify 
subspecies of Francisella tularensis, and tests 
to determine which subtypes are most likely 
to cause severe tularemia. These methods also 
test antimicrobial susceptibility of Francisella 
tularensis, providing the framework for early 
identification of any unusual antimicrobial 
susceptibility patterns associated with 
bioterrorism. CDC continues to refine these 
tests as they are used and evaluated.
Developing methods to detect biothreat agents •	
in water. Before 2007, multiple methods 
were required to detect viral, bacterial, and 
parasitic agents in water. Now CDC has a 
single sampling procedure to detect each of 
these types of agents. The new procedure 
allows CDC to respond to these health 
threats more quickly and efficiently. CDC has 
demonstrated both the method’s effectiveness 
for drinking water collected from different 
regions of the United States and the method’s 
robustness for capturing and recovering 
pathogens in nonpotable surface water (e.g., 
lakes and rivers) and ground water. 
Promoting safety and security for entities 
that possess, use, or transfer select agents 
and toxins. To protect against accidental 
or intentional release of harmful biological 
agents, Congress authorized HHS and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture to regulate the 
possession, use, and transfer of biological agents 
and toxins that have the potential to pose a severe 
threat to public health and safety, animal or
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plant health, or animal or plant products — select 
agents.28 Through the Select Agent Program, CDC 
carries out these regulatory responsibilities and has 
oversight of the biosafety, security, and training 
for entities29 that possess select agents that have 
the potential to pose a severe threat to human 
health. Select agents include the bacteria that 
cause anthrax and plague and the virus that causes 
smallpox.30 
In FY 2007, 326 entities were registered with 
CDC for the possession, use, or transfer of select 
agents. To promote safety and security at these 
entities, CDC inspects these entities to ensure 
compliance with select agent regulations and 
provides guidance to the regulated community. 
All registered entities are inspected at least once 
every three years. In FY 2007, CDC inspected 
110 entities registered to possess select agents. 
These assessments allow inspectors to confirm that 
registered entities had the appropriate security 
and safety measures in place to prevent theft, loss, 
or release of select agents. The inspections also 
help ensure that laboratorians were adequately 
trained to work safely with the agents and that 
accountability records were maintained. 
The CDC Select Agent Program promotes 
laboratory safety and security by providing 
guidance to entities possessing select agents. 
In 2007, CDC collaborated with the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture to develop guidance 
related to a security plan template; inspection 
checklists; theft, loss, and release; and videos 
describing the facility inspection process. CDC 
also works with entities to ensure that all select 
agents are properly secured in the event of a 
natural disaster (see box above).
A fundamental element of the select agent 
regulations is to keep select agents out of the 
possession of persons seeking to misuse them. 
CDC works closely with the Department of 
Justice’s Criminal Justice Information Service 
(CJIS) to identify those individuals who 
are prohibited from having access to select 
agents based on the restrictions identified 
in the USA PATRIOT Act. CJIS conducts 
security risk assessments of all individuals and 
nongovernmental entities that request to possess, 
use, or transfer select agents. Based on the results 
of the CJIS security risk assessments, CDC 
approves individuals and nongovernmental entities 
to access select agents.
Providing CDC capability and capacity for 
laboratory testing of biological and chemical 
agents. CDC can test for a variety of agents, 
including biosafety level 4 agents (e.g., smallpox 
virus and Ebola viruses). These agents pose a high 
individual risk of aerosol-transmitted laboratory 
infections and life-threatening disease. CDC 
consults regularly with public health authorities 
and clinicians from the United States and around 
the world about suspected high-hazard pathogens. 
Clinical materials are sent to CDC for laboratory 
testing. Some particularly virulent agents have 
included Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, and Crimean-
Congo hemorrhagic fever viruses. In addition to
CDC scientists support 
other federal agencies 
through agreements 
when these agencies 
are faced with testing 
demands outside 
 their capabilities.
CDC provides oversight of entities that 
possess, use, or transfer select agents that 
may pose a severe threat to human health.
Source: CDC
Preparing Facilities Registered with CDC 
for Emergencies
CDC has proactively worked with registered 
entities in advance of natural disasters to ensure 
that all select agents are properly secured. 
Before the landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, CDC contacted all registered entities 
located in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. 
CDC collected information regarding the 
entities’ plans to safeguard select agents 
during and after the storm and informed the 
entities that CDC stood ready to expedite the 
emergency transfer of select agents as needed. 
CDC took similar action in 2006 and 2007 
in anticipation of other hurricanes and 
predictable natural disasters (such as floods) to 
minimize risk and any impact on public health 
and safety. CDC contacts all registered entities 
at risk of damage and offers assistance in 
identifying registered entities in safe areas that 
can receive select agents so that entities at risk 
can protect their agents from loss.
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CDC Scientists Help Solve Panama Mystery Illness
In FY 2007, CDC scientists were deployed to the Republic of Panama to investigate the cause 
of numerous deaths and serious illness in almost two-dozen patients. The illness, which initially 
seemed to strike mostly men over 60, began with diarrhea and fever and progressed to acute kidney 
failure, paralysis, and death.
Upon arrival in Panama, the CDC team quickly gathered medical samples from patients – as well 
as from a variety of possible poisoning sources – and sent them back to the agency’s infectious-
disease and environmental laboratories in Atlanta, sometimes within hours because of immediate 
access to CDC’s airplane. At CDC, teams of experts tested specimens for infectious diseases while 
simultaneously conducting urgent laboratory examinations of products found in patients’ homes.
Just nine days after the CDC team landed in Panama, the CDC environmental health laboratory 
identified the culprit. Somehow, diethylene glycol (DEG) had been introduced into government-
made, generic-label, sugar-free cough and anti-allergy syrups. Exposure to large amounts of 
DEG – a clear liquid commonly found in brake fluids, antifreeze, and fuel additives – can 
damage the kidneys, heart, and nervous system. The 
incident ultimately led to the deaths of at least 100 people. 
Panamanian health authorities acted quickly, withdrawing 
the contaminated medications from clinics, and people were 
notified to immediately discontinue their use. [For more 
information see Journal of the American Medical Association 
2007;297:2577 and Journal of Analytical Toxicology 
2007;31(6):295-303.]
these known infectious agents, CDC frequently 
serves as the initial diagnostic laboratory for new 
and unknown diseases. Recent examples have 
included a fifth strain of Ebola virus and a new 
arenavirus that caused fatal infections.
CDC scientists support other federal agencies 
through agreements when these agencies are 
faced with testing demands outside their 
capabilities. In 2007, CDC and its laboratory 
network supported requests from the U.S. 
Department of Defense to test clinical samples 
for biomarkers of nerve agents, sulfur mustard, 
hydrazine, and depleted uranium from people 
with suspected exposure.
Deploying skilled personnel to investigate 
international health threats. CDC personnel 
qualified to work with deadly organisms such as 
the viruses that cause highly fatal hemorrhagic 
fevers can be deployed to assist other countries 
in laboratory testing and disease investigation. 
In 2007, these staff investigated three major 
outbreaks in Africa: Rift Valley fever virus in 
Kenya, Marburg virus in Uganda, and Ebola 
virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
These dangerous viruses are not native to the 
United States, but they can be introduced if 
infected people travel internationally, as occurred 
with Lassa fever in 2004 in New Jersey.
Protecting the public and responders during 
emergencies. CDC laboratories are also engaged 
in long-term projects to help protect responders 
and the public during emergencies. Examples 
include:
Assessing how to make water safe for •	
human consumption after a biological agent 
contaminates the water supply. A safe water 
source is crucial for both responders and the 
public.
Source: CDC
CDC scientists are deployed to assist other 
countries in investigating disease outbreaks.
Source: CDC
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Assessing how long certain threats persist in •	
the environment after contamination. This 
knowledge is essential for understanding if 
people should be evacuated and for how long.
Evaluating smallpox vaccines and treatments •	
to determine how effectively they can prevent 
or lessen the effects of smallpox. Currently, no 
antiviral treatments for smallpox infection 
have been licensed by the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration. In 2007, CDC 
compared the protection provided by two 
different smallpox vaccines and performed 
laboratory testing for potential treatments for 
the smallpox virus. In March 2007, CDC’s 
smallpox expertise was called upon when 
a toddler became ill with a life-threatening 
infection from exposure to and infection with 
smallpox vaccine (vaccinia virus). See box on 
page 36 for more details.
Developing real-time DNA tests to determine •	
if the bacteria causing anthrax, plague, and 
tularemia are resistant to antibiotics. In 
FY 2007, CDC developed real-time tests 
to detect genes resistant to the antibiotic 
tetracycline and will continue to develop tests 
to detect resistance to other antibiotics. The 
new tests will reduce the detection time of 
resistance from days to hours. 
Challenges for Public Health Laboratory 
Science and Service
Increasing radiologic response capacity. 
To respond effectively following a radiologic 
incident (e.g., a dirty bomb or nuclear 
detonation), testing for radioactive materials 
(radionuclides) is critical. Methods to rapidly 
and accurately assess internal contamination31 
for a broad array of radionuclides are needed 
to direct appropriate medical treatment; these 
methods provide essential information on 
human exposures to health officials about what 
agents have been used, who has been exposed, 
and the extent to which each person has been 
exposed. Currently, there is no state laboratory 
capacity and limited federal capacity to test for 
radionuclides. Only seven radionuclides (of 
approximately 25 priority radionuclides) can 
currently be identified within a few hours using 
CDC’s Urine Radionuclide Screen.
CDC is working to increase the number of 
radionuclides that can be identified with the 
Radionuclide Screen to include all priority 
radionuclides. CDC would like to eventually 
expand radiologic and nuclear laboratory 
capability and capacity by providing the 
Radionuclide Screen to selected state public 
health laboratories as part of the LRN. This 
will include the technology transfer of analytic 
methods, training, a proficiency-testing program, 
and response exercises with state and federal 
partners. The radiologic LRN would provide 
laboratory data to support health physicists and 
others in activities including field investigations 
and response. 
Increasing personnel for laboratory surge 
capacity. The number of qualified laboratory 
personnel is typically the determining factor for 
the number of samples that can be tested in a 
given period of time (i.e., throughput). During 
a public health emergency, more personnel are 
often needed to test samples quickly and handle 
additional tests for extended periods of time. 
During the SARS outbreak in 2003, many CDC 
laboratorians reported exhaustion from the long 
work hours, and many routine public health 
laboratory activities came to a standstill. 
At the state level, public health laboratories 
may be unable to sustain surge operations for 
prolonged periods because of the inadequate 
number of highly skilled personnel. In 2007, 
more than half (59%) of all state public health 
laboratories experienced difficulty in recruiting 
or retaining staff, and 65% experienced hiring 
difficulties.32 
Developing new laboratory methods and 
enhancing existing methods. More specific 
and timely characterization of known threat 
agents is needed to determine their virulence or 
resistance to treatment. Research is also needed 
to develop laboratory methods to identify, 
characterize, and track emerging threats, 
especially in environmental settings. Existing 
methods for measuring exposure to chemical 
agents need to be improved and new methods for 
chemical agents of concern need to be developed. 
Developing more rapid screening methods 
used at the point of care and moving approved 
diagnostic tests to hospital-based laboratories will 
decrease the time needed to diagnose disease, 
ensure appropriate use of limited available 
treatments, and reduce costs and infrastructure 
needs currently in place.
CDC laboratory scientists 
were the first to identify 
the newly emerged 
Nipah virus, Ebola 
outbreaks including 
a new Ebola virus 
in Uganda in 2007, 
continuing Hantavirus 
outbreaks, and a new 
coronavirus that was the 
cause of severe acute 
respiratory syndrome 
(SARS).
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The challenges for public health laboratory 
science and service contribute to challenges that 
cut across CDC’s core public health functions. 
Adopting interoperable laboratory systems is 
one of many issues contributing to the broader 
challenge of having integrated biosurveillance 
systems and activities. In addition, the challenges 
of increasing radiologic capacity and developing 
additional and improved laboratory methods 
are part of the broader challenge of enhancing 
CDC’s scenario-specific response capabilities. 
Finally, having sufficient numbers of trained 
staff is a challenge faced within public health 
laboratory science in addition to other core 
public health functions. For more information 
about the broader, cross-cutting challenges that 
CDC faces and priorities in place to address 
these challenges, see Chapter 7, “Moving 
Forward,” on page 47.
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Chapter 5: Response and Recovery 
Operations
When a disaster occurs, CDC must respond effectively and support national, state, 
and local partners. A critical component of the 
agency’s work during an event is to coordinate 
response activities and provide resources to state 
and local public health departments. Effective 
response and recovery requires that extensive 
planning and ongoing operational activities 
occur.
CDC’s response and recovery preparedness 
objective is to assure an integrated, sustainable, 
nationwide response and recovery capacity to 
limit morbidity and mortality from public health 
threats. TPER activities in this area consisted 
of 32 projects, which occur in 7 of CDC’s 
major offices and centers. FY 2007 funding for 
activities supporting this objective was more 
than $550 million, approximately 90% of which 
was allocated to ensure the availability of key 
medical supplies through the Strategic National 
Stockpile.
Major CDC activities and accomplishments that 
focus on achieving the response and recovery 
operations objective include:
Operating a command center for monitoring •	
and coordinating emergency response;
Planning, training, exercising, and evaluating •	
to improve emergency response;
Responding to hazardous substance •	
emergencies;
Ensuring availability of key medical supplies •	
during emergencies;
Restricting the spread of health threats at •	
U.S. borders;
Providing risk and emergency •	
communication capabilities;
Supporting the protection of vulnerable •	
populations; and
Protecting the health, safety, and resiliency of •	
emergency responders during an event.
Operating a command center for monitoring 
and coordinating emergency response.  
In 2001, CDC headquarters for response 
activities consisted of available conference 
rooms with limited equipment. The Director’s 
Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) now 
enables CDC to maintain situational awareness 
of public health-related events or incidents at the 
international, national, state, and local levels. The 
DEOC serves as the contact point for reporting 
public health threats and supports the HHS 
Secretary’s Operations Center. 
The DEOC was established in 2003 to 
coordinate emergency responses to public health 
threats in the United States and abroad.33 Staffed 
around-the-clock, the facility provides CDC with 
the ability to detect public health threats more 
quickly. The DEOC organizes CDC scientific 
experts in one location during an emergency 
response to efficiently exchange information 
and connect with local, state, federal, and 
international partners. For multistate or severe 
emergencies, CDC can provide additional public 
health resources and coordinate response efforts 
across multiple jurisdictions, both domestically 
and abroad.34 
To support state and local efforts during an 
emergency response, the DEOC coordinates 
deployment of CDC staff and equipment. 
This coordination includes the procurement 
and management of all the equipment and 
Source: CDC
CDC Director’s Emergency Operations Center 
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supplies that CDC responders need during 
their deployment. In addition, the DEOC 
has the capability to transport life-supporting 
medications, samples/specimens, and personnel 
at any time anywhere in the world via aircraft 
that can be launched within 4 hours of 
notification for domestic and 6 hours for 
international responses.35 
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments for 
monitoring and coordinating emergency 
response included:
Responding to 33 domestic and 12 •	
international events for a total of 326 days in 
which the DEOC was activated or engaged, 
including responding to incidents such as 
Hurricane Dean and a suspected case of 
extremely drug-resistant tuberculosis traveling 
on an international flight. 
Deploying CDC personnel to Kenya and •	
Tanzania to investigate a Rift Valley fever 
outbreak, to Uganda to investigate a Marburg 
outbreak, to the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to investigate an Ebola outbreak, and 
to the Republic of Panama to investigate a 
toxic chemical exposure (see box on page 28).
Providing the necessary equipment for more •	
than 1,000 CDC deployed personnel for 
emergency response operations, EPI-AID 
investigations,36 and daily operations.
Developing the Biological Containment •	
System Program in collaboration with CDC’s 
Office of Health and Safety and the U.S. 
Department of Defense. When completed, 
this system will provide a MEDEVAC37 
capability for the Emergency Operations 
aircraft to transport infectious and/or 
contagious38 patients requiring isolation.
Using the Emergency Operations aircraft •	
eight times to support real-world events and 
exercises.
Planning, training, exercising, and evaluating 
to improve emergency response. CDC is 
continually working to enhance its preparedness 
for all-hazard emergencies. A significant part 
of this work includes planning, training, and 
conducting exercises, and then evaluating CDC’s 
ability to respond after a simulated exercise or a 
real-life incident.
Planning. CDC develops emergency operation 
plans that describe the roles and responsibilities 
of different offices, centers, and institutes across 
CDC during an emergency event or incident. 
CDC has an all-hazards base plan, the CDC 
Emergency Operations Plan, which outlines 
core roles and responsibilities for all-hazard 
responses, as well as specific plans outlining roles 
and responsibilities for scenario-specific events or 
incidents (e.g., hurricanes or anthrax incidents). 
Training. In FY 2007, more than 200 CDC 
employees were trained on the Incident 
Command System (ICS),39 the common 
emergency response operating system that 
serves as the basis for the National Incident 
Management System. This training helps to 
ensure that CDC field response teams are able 
to operate effectively as part of the state or local 
response structure they are deployed to assist. 
It also helps CDC staff assigned to the DEOC 
as part of the CDC Incident Management 
System to collaborate more effectively with 
their counterparts in state and local emergency 
operations centers. All 50 states have also 
trained public health officials on their roles 
and responsibilities during an emergency as 
outlined by ICS. The widespread use of ICS 
enables personnel to work together using 
common terminology, procedures, roles, and 
responsibilities. In addition to ICS training, 
CDC staff participating in preparedness exercises 
often receive training on the CDC emergency 
operations plans specific to the exercise scenario.  
Exercising. Exercises are key to enhancing CDC’s 
response capabilities. CDC conducts exercises 
to practice and evaluate the integration and 
coordination of its response capabilities. In 
FY 2007, CDC conducted or participated in 
exercises addressing CDC response to simulated 
Source: CDC
CDC epidemiologist collects an oral swab 
during a Marburg outbreak investigation in 
Uganda.
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Examples of Strategic National 
Stockpile Supplies that Help Protect 
the Nation*
Enough smallpox vaccine to protect 300 million people, or •	
every man, woman, and child in America
Vaccines and antibiotics to prevent and treat anthrax•	
Countermeasures to address radiation exposure•	
Antiviral drugs and vaccines for an influenza pandemic•	 CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile includes medical countermeasures, equipment,  
and supplies (Source: CDC)
incidents such as hurricanes, the detonation of 
radiological dispersal devices (e.g., dirty bombs), 
and an outbreak of pandemic influenza.
Evaluating. Planning, training, and exercising 
prepare CDC for real-world incidents and are 
evaluated and refined following each major 
exercise, event, or incident. CDC evaluates its 
performance through an after action report 
and an improvement plan process to ensure 
that appropriate improvements are made in 
preparedness activities. This process helps assess 
what worked well during an exercise, event, or 
incident and what can be improved. 
Responding to hazardous substance 
emergencies. CDC’s hazardous substance 
emergency response team supports federal, 
state, and local responders during an emergency. 
Hazardous substances include mercury, 
pesticides, asbestos, chlorine, and unknown 
chemical agents. The response team is on call to 
provide scientific expertise on subjects such as 
chemistry, toxicology, environmental science, 
and medical treatment for exposure to hazardous 
substances. Teams are available around-the-clock, 
and provide an on-site response team anywhere 
in the continental United States, usually within  
eight hours of a request.
Ensuring availability of key medical supplies 
during emergencies. Established in 1999, 
CDC’s Strategic National Stockpile has large 
quantities of medicine, vaccines, and medical 
supplies to protect the U.S. population if a 
public health emergency is severe enough 
to cause local supplies to run out. This 
approximately $3.5 billion40 resource has 
the drugs and vaccines needed to protect the 
public from bioterrorist attacks. In strategic 
locations around the nation, Stockpile assets 
are designed to supplement and resupply state 
and local public health agencies in the event of 
a large-scale public health emergency anywhere 
and at anytime within the United States or its 
territories. Stockpile assets, when combined 
with federal, state, and local technical expertise 
to manage and distribute them efficiently, help 
ensure key medical supplies are available to 
prepare for and respond during emergencies. 
Types of Stockpile Supplies. The Stockpile is a 
national repository of antibiotics, antiviral drugs, 
chemical antidotes, antitoxins, vaccines, life-
supporting medications, and medical supplies 
(see box above). Stockpile supplies include:
Medical supplies from 12-hour Push Packages •	
and Managed Inventory. Each state has 
plans to receive Stockpile supplies and 
distribute them as quickly as possible 
*Adapted from the testimony of Gerald W. Parker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and 
Response, before the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science & Technology, April 2007. 
When the threat is ill-defined,  
12-hour Push Packages provide the 
capability to rapidly deliver medical  
assets early in an event.
Source: CDC
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to local jurisdictions, which dispense to 
their communities. Once federal and state 
authorities agree that the Stockpile is needed, 
pre-configured medicine and medical supplies 
can be delivered to any state in the continental 
United States within 12 hours of the decision 
to deploy. Each 12-hour Push Package contains 
50 tons of pharmaceuticals and medical 
supplies designed to provide rapid delivery of 
a broad spectrum of assets in the early hours 
of an event. If the incident requires additional 
or different pharmaceuticals and/or medical 
supplies, Managed Inventory supplies can arrive 
within 24 to 36 hours.
CHEMPACK supplies.•	  CHEMPACK is a 
nationwide program of containers of nerve-
agent antidotes at the state and local levels, 
which increases the capability to respond 
quickly to a nerve-agent event. These antidotes 
come in two types of containers: the hospital 
container, designed for hospital dispensing, with 
medication available in multidose vials; and the 
Emergency Medical Services container, designed 
for use by first responders, with medication 
available in auto-injectors. Now more than 
92% of the U.S. population is within a 1-hour 
buffer to access these life-sustaining antidotes 
with containers available in more than 1,300 
different sites throughout all 50 states and 
Washington, D.C.
Federal Medical Stations. •	 These stations provide 
a modular and rapidly deployable medical 
healthcare platform for the care of displaced 
persons who have nonacute medical, mental 
health, or other health-related needs that cannot 
be accommodated or provided for in a shelter 
for the general population during an event. 
These stations are stocked with beds, supplies, 
and medicine to care for up to 250 nonacute 
and special-needs patients for up to three days. 
They are modular, scalable, and modeled for 
all age populations and can be transported by 
air or ground for rapid, maximum geographic 
distribution upon request in an emergency. 
A standard station must be housed inside 
an existing structurally intact building with 
electricity, heating, air conditioning, ventilation, 
and clean water services (commonly described 
as a building of opportunity).
Management of Stockpile Supplies and Technical 
Assistance. Managing the procurement, storage, 
and transportation of medical supplies in the 
Stockpile entails ensuring that pharmaceuticals are 
kept within U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
potency shelf-life limits, conducting quality 
assurance practices, and ensuring materials added 
to the Stockpile are based on the latest scientific 
data, threat levels, and overall ability to deploy 
to a public health emergency.41 This involves 
quarterly quality assurance and quality control 
checks on all 12-hour Push Packages; yearly manual 
counts of Managed Inventory; and inspections of 
environmental conditions, security, and storage 
facilities. 
CDC provides technical assistance to state and 
local sites both in preparation for public health 
emergencies and when Stockpile assets are 
deployed. Pre-event assistance for public health 
emergencies is provided by CDC program services 
consultants, who routinely visit state, local, and 
large metropolitan public health departments42 to 
assist them in planning for the receipt, distribution, 
and dispensing of critical medicines specific to 
jurisdictional needs. Technical assistance includes 
site visits, thorough review of preparedness plans, 
telephone consultations, training courses, and 
satellite broadcasts. 
CDC also provides forums for the jurisdictions to 
share promising practices electronically through 
a ListServ as well as through regional workshops. 
States and selected cities are evaluated annually 
to demonstrate a level of preparedness against 
standards in key functional areas established by 
CDC. Annual performance objectives and targets 
focus assistance and resources on the nation’s 
preparedness needs. 
Source: CDC
Federal Medical Stations provide nonacute and 
special needs care during catastrophic health 
events.
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Cities Readiness Initiative  
Enhances Preparedness
The Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) focuses on enhancing preparedness for countermeasure 
dispensing in the nation’s largest metropolitan statistical areas (MSA), where more than half of the 
U.S. population resides. Through CRI, state and large metropolitan public health departments 
have been developing plans to dispense medical countermeasures to the entire population of an 
identified MSA within 48 hours. The CRI project started in 2004 with 21 MSAs and has expanded 
to 72, with at least one CRI MSA in every state (see www.emergency.cdc.gov/cri).
CRI has helped to enhance communication and collaboration between state and local public health 
departments, resulting in optimal use of shared resources. A significant milestone in FY 2007 has 
been private sector partnerships to improve Stockpile planning and assessment.
72 CRI Metropolitan Statistical Area Locations; 2007
Source: CDC
When certain Stockpile assets are deployed, 
technical advisory support is provided through 
specialized CDC teams. These teams work with 
state and local officials to ensure efficient receipt 
and distribution of assets upon arrival. 
Building the capability to ensure that key 
medical supplies are available during emergencies 
is a continuous process of acquiring and 
managing assets, providing technical assistance, 
and evaluating readiness. In FY 2007, specific 
accomplishments to support this effort included:
Acquiring critical, life-supporting medicine •	
and medical supplies;
Conducting 208 site visits to assist state •	
and local public health departments in 
the planning and implementation stages 
for receiving, distributing, and dispensing 
Stockpile assets in the event of a public health 
emergency;
Using Stockpile aircraft 14 times to support •	
real-world events and exercises (see box on 
page 36);
Evaluating all 50 states and four metropolitan •	
statistical areas on their ability to demonstrate 
their level of preparedness against standards 
in key preparedness functional areas 
established by CDC;
Partnering with businesses and other •	
governmental entities to explore alternate 
methods of providing needed medical 
supplies to the public and improving existing 
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CDC’s Rapid Response Provides Critical Support  
in Life-Threatening Situation
In March 2007, a doctor from the University of Chicago Comer Children’s Hospital contacted 
CDC for help in diagnosing and treating a 2-year-old child who had developed eczema vaccinatum 
(EV). EV is a life-threatening skin infection caused by the vaccinia virus, the virus which is used 
as the smallpox vaccine. EV can occur when people who have eczema come into contact with 
someone who has recently been vaccinated for smallpox. The child, who had severe eczema, 
inadvertently had contact with his father who had received the smallpox vaccination weeks earlier 
as part of military deployment preparation. 
CDC and the Illinois Department of Public Health 
Laboratory – a member of CDC’s Laboratory Response 
Network – collaborated to rapidly identify and confirm 
the diagnosis. CDC provided medications to the hospital 
in less than 6 hours after the decision to deploy its 
Strategic National Stockpile aircraft. During a one-month 
period, CDC coordinated six trips, three of which used 
Stockpile aircraft, to deliver 69 vials of vaccinia immune 
globulin (which was not widely available) to treat the 
child and his mother, who had developed a less serious 
infection. In addition, CDC officials worked with the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration to provide a smallpox antiviral drug (ST-246), provided under 
an Investigational New Drug protocol, to help with the boy’s recovery.
The quick activation of CDC Stockpile assets, mobilization of CDC experts, and collaboration 
with the Illinois Department of Public Health helped save the lives of the child and mother and 
prevented further medical complications. [For more information see Morbidity and Mortality Weekly 
Report 2007;56(19); 478-481.]
Providing 31 training courses, with more •	
than 1,000 attendees, to state and local 
public health departments on how to quickly 
receive, stage, store, and dispense assets from 
the Stockpile. 
Restricting the spread of health threats at U.S. 
borders. The growing concern about the threat 
of importing infectious diseases through mobile 
populations, animals, and cargo emphasizes 
the need to monitor and protect U.S. borders. 
CDC’s quarantine and migration health system 
provides the critical infrastructure to support the 
preparedness and response activities associated 
with global infectious disease threats that may 
enter the United States. In collaboration with 
partners, the quarantine and migration health 
system and other parts of CDC play a key role in 
stopping the spread of communicable diseases. 
On the global front, the quarantine and 
migration health system improves the medical 
screening and disease detection in refugee and 
immigrant populations prior to their arriving in 
the United States. The system also responds to 
disease outbreaks and other public health needs 
among U.S.-bound refugees.
Strategically located at ports of entry and 
land-border crossings where the majority of 
international travelers arrive in the United 
States, domestic quarantine stations allow 
CDC to restrict the spread of health threats in 
the country. An Institute of Medicine report 
published in September 2005 recommended that 
CDC increase the number of quarantine stations 
from 8 to 25.44 In response, CDC increased the 
number of U.S. Quarantine Stations from 8 in 
2004 to 20 in 2007 (see figure 3 on page 37). 
The two newest quarantine stations in Dallas and 
Philadelphia were opened in FY 2007. 
Stations are staffed with quarantine medical and 
public health officers from CDC who assess 
whether ill persons may have a communicable 
disease and take appropriate measures to prevent 
the spread of the disease. Station staff work with 
state and local health officials, Customs and 
Border Patrol, and the Transportation Security 
Administration to prevent disease spread. CDC 
Source: CDC
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Figure 3: CDC Quarantine Stations and Jurisdictions; 2007
has the legal authority to apprehend, detain, 
examine, and conditionally release individuals 
arriving in the United States from a foreign 
country and those individuals traveling between 
states suspected of carrying certain specified 
communicable diseases.45 The communicable 
diseases are specified through an executive order 
of the President and currently include cholera, 
diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, 
smallpox, yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, 
SARS, and new types of influenza with the 
potential to cause a pandemic. 
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments that 
support restricting the spread of threats at U.S. 
borders included:
Stopping measles, polio, and Rift Valley •	
fever cases from Kenyan refugee camps from 
entering the United States;
Ensuring infectious disease response plans •	
were in development with port-of-entry 
partners at all United States quarantine 
stations;
Conducting infectious disease response •	
exercises at quarantine stations; and
Establishing intergovernmental collaboration •	
with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and 
the United Kingdom for overseas health 
screening of immigrants and refugees. 
Providing risk and emergency communication 
capabilities. Getting accurate information to 
people quickly is a key component to saving 
lives during an emergency. Crisis and emergency 
risk communication provides information 
for individuals, stakeholders, or an entire 
community to support the best possible decisions 
to protect their health. CDC is using a variety 
of tools to effectively communicate accurate 
information about public health threats. These 
tools include the Public Information Contact 
Center and Clinician Information Line, the 
Clinician Outreach and Communication 
Activity, the Emergency Preparedness and 
Response website, and translation services for 
emergency information. 
Public Information Contact Center and Clinician 
Information Line. CDC expanded the toll-free 
CDC-INFO public information contact center 
to ensure that the general public, clinicians, 
and emergency responders have a place to call 
and obtain information during a public health 
emergency.
Clinician Outreach and Communication 
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of information to clinicians, CDC operates 
the Clinician Outreach and Communication 
Activity (COCA).46  CDC sends weekly e-mail 
updates of recent changes to information on 
emergency preparedness and response topics, and 
other related health issues to the approximately 
40,000 individual members and 145 partner 
health and medical organizations. CDC also 
announces new training opportunities related 
to emergency preparedness and response topics 
to clinician members. In FY 2007, 105 COCA 
updates on emergency preparedness and response 
information were disseminated to clinicians.
Emergency Preparedness and Response Website. 
CDC’s Emergency Preparedness and Response 
website (www.emergency.cdc.gov), developed 
in 2002, provides updated content on natural 
disasters, terrorist events, national emergencies, 
and outbreaks within a half-hour of when new, 
relevant information becomes available. Targeted 
information can be accessed by critical audiences 
such as the general public, first responders, 
clinicians, laboratorians, and state and local 
public health workforce. The website contains 
resources on more than 100 emergency topics. 
In 2007, CDC added a new section to the 
website, titled Emergency Preparedness and You, 
targeted toward helping members of the general 
public increase personal preparedness. Podcasts 
are also available, as well as the option to receive 
e-mail updates on topics of interest.
Translation Services for Emergency Information. 
CDC can translate information and emergency 
requests into more than 75 languages. This 
translation capability enables CDC to provide 
appropriate communications to a variety of 
populations, especially in the event of an 
emergency. Other available services include 
interpretation, signing, and voice-over in Spanish 
for any audio or video files. 
CDC’s Emergency Preparedness and Response website contains resources on 
more than 100 emergency topics. 
Source: CDC
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In FY 2007, specific accomplishments included:
Making the Emergency Preparedness and •	
Response website available in 9 different 
languages with selected support documents 
available in another 13 languages;47
Translating public service announcements •	
into American Sign Language, and making 
video clips available on the Emergency 
Preparedness and Response website;
Translating the “Blast Injuries: Essential •	
Facts” fact sheet, used by CDC to respond 
to terrorist bombings, into seven different 
languages and making nine additional blast 
injury fact sheets also available in French, 
Spanish, and Chinese; and
Translating CDC Crisis and Emergency •	
Risk Communication training materials 
into different languages, allowing for global 
dissemination.
Supporting the protection of vulnerable 
populations. Successful planning and response 
to public health hazards requires protecting 
the health and safety of vulnerable popula tions 
before, during, and after emergencies. These 
groups include populations whose circumstances 
and conditions require distinct, special, and 
additional attention to ensure safety and well-
being in a particular emergency setting. To help 
state and local public health departments identify 
these populations, CDC developed an index 
using a geographic information system and a 
software application to produce county-based 
maps of vulnerable populations. More than 20 
states are using this software in their preparedness 
planning. 
Protecting the health, safety, and resiliency 
of emergency responders during an event. 
Emergency responders play a critical role 
in protecting people during public health 
emergencies, terrorist acts, and numerous other 
emergency events. CDC occupational safety 
experts serve as the focal point of technical 
expertise, on-site support, and research on safety 
management practices to enhance preparedness 
and response efforts for emergency responders.
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments included:
Establishing a research portfolio outlining •	
strategic goals and research needs regarding 
worker safety for the emergency response 
community,
Coordinating with other federal partners •	
to develop recommendations for protecting 
response and recovery personnel working 
extended hours,48 and
Publishing information on worker protection •	
during an influenza pandemic.49 
Challenges for Response and Recovery 
Operations 
Enhancing emergency response through 
preparedness exercises. Preparation for public 
health emergencies requires both the successful 
building of core emergency response capabilities 
that can be applied to all hazards, as well 
as specific capabilities unique to individual 
scenarios. Although CDC has conducted 
numerous emergency response exercises, there 
are many potential public health threat scenarios 
that have not yet been addressed in exercises. 
Therefore, additional planning and exercising for 
threats that have not been included in previous 
exercises would enhance preparedness. 
CDC is establishing a five-year calendar of 
scenario-specific exercises designed to enable 
CDC responders to practice scenario-specific 
plans. The overall goal of these exercises is to 
ensure, expand, and strengthen an integrated, 
sustainable, nationwide response and recovery 
capacity to limit morbidity and mortality from 
public health threats. 
Building surge capacity for CDC response 
personnel. Although progress has been made in 
increasing the number of personnel identified, 
trained, and medically cleared to deploy in 
response to an event, CDC must continue to 
work toward having skilled personnel with the 
right expertise and a sufficient number of these 
qualified personnel to sustain surge operations 
for all domestic and international events. 
Existing personal protection equipment and 
pharmaceutical supplies are not sufficient to 
support deployment personnel for all emergency 
scenarios.
Expanding the quarantine system. To develop 
coordinated quarantine capacity, CDC needs to 
continue increasing the number of quarantine 
stations at major ports of entry, establish 
initiatives on border security as part of CDC’s 
discussions with public health counterparts 
in Mexico and Canada, and address legal 
and ethical questions regarding isolation and 
quarantine measures in communities to impede 
the spread of communicable diseases. 
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Improving the safety and health of emergency 
responders. Failure to place as much emphasis 
on responders as is placed on victim rescue and 
site recovery hampers the ability of federal, state, 
and local governments to determine responder 
healthcare needs. Identifying responders needing 
periodic health monitoring and treatment 
both in the field and after returning from a 
deployment, and identifying trends and patterns 
of illness or injury arising from response activities 
are critical to improving responder safety and 
health. 
Defining a research agenda for public 
health preparedness including vulnerable 
populations. Currently, there is no integrated 
public health preparedness research agenda that 
focuses future scientific efforts on identifying 
best practices. A comprehensive research agenda 
for public health preparedness is needed to 
drive system improvements and initiate a 
comprehensive evaluation program for public 
health activities. Information on the optimal 
strategies for assisting vulnerable populations 
during an emergency is also incomplete. 
Additional research needs to focus on vulnerable 
populations and community resilience. At 
CDC’s request, the Institute of Medicine made 
recommendations regarding research priorities 
for improving emergency preparedness and 
response systems in public health.50 

Several of the challenges for response and 
recovery operations contribute to challenges that 
cut across CDC’s core public health functions. 
The challenge of enhancing emergency response 
through preparedness exercises is part of the 
broader challenge of enhancing CDC’s scenario- 
specific response capabilities. Also, having 
sufficient numbers of trained staff for surge 
capacity is a challenge faced within response 
and recovery operations in addition to other 
core public health functions. Finally, defining a 
research agenda for public health preparedness 
including vulnerable populations is one of 
many issues that needs to be addressed to assist 
vulnerable populations. For more information 
about the broader, cross-cutting challenges 
that CDC faces and priorities to address these 
challenges, see Chapter 7, “Moving Forward,” on 
page 47.
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Chapter 6: Public Health System Support
To enhance preparedness and response, CDC supports state, local, territorial, and tribal 
public health systems so they are better able to 
fulfill their responsibilities for the public health 
and welfare of the people in their jurisdiction. 
State and local governments are closest to those 
impacted by incidents and have always had the 
lead in response and recovery. During a response, 
states coordinate resources and capabilities 
throughout the state and obtain additional 
resources and capabilities from other states and 
the federal government. 
CDC’s public health system support 
preparedness objective is to expand and 
strengthen integrated, sustained, national, 
foundational and surge capacities capable of 
reaching all individuals with effective assistance 
to address public health threats. TPER activities 
in this area consisted of 27 projects in 5 of 
CDC’s major offices and centers. FY 2007 
funding for activities supporting this objective 
was more than $750 million, approximately 90% 
of which was allocated to support state and local 
health departments through the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement.
Major CDC activities and accomplishments 
that focus on achieving the public health system 
support objective include:
Supporting state and local health departments •	
through funding and technical assistance;
Collaborating, training, and providing •	
educational tools to enhance preparedness; 
and
Strengthening legal preparedness for public •	
health emergencies.
Supporting state and local health departments 
through funding and technical assistance. 
CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
(PHEP) cooperative agreement is a critical source 
of technical assistance and funding for state and 
local health departments. The PHEP cooperative 
agreement began in 1999 to develop public 
health infrastructure, capacity, and plans to 
respond to events of terrorism and related public 
health emergencies. At first, only a few states 
and large metropolitan areas were funded. After 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and 
the anthrax attacks of October 2001, Congress 
appropriated supplemental funding to CDC 
to distribute to 62 state, local, territorial, and 
tribal public health departments51 to implement 
a comprehensive terrorism preparedness and 
emergency response program. As of FY 2007, 
CDC had provided more than $5 billion in 
funding. 
CDC provides technical assistance to 
each jurisdiction to develop critical public 
health preparedness capacities, including 
preparedness planning and readiness assessment, 
surveillance and epidemiology, biological and 
chemical laboratory capability and capacity, 
communications systems and information 
technology, health information dissemination 
and risk communication, and education and 
training. The technical assistance includes 
sharing CDC public health expertise, identifying 
promising practices, providing guidance for 
exercises, and developing performance goals.
With funding support from the PHEP 
cooperative agreement, public health 
departments have made progress in preparedness, 
including developing response plans, 
implementing a formalized incident command 
structure, and conducting exercises. In addition, 
public health departments can better detect and 
investigate diseases because of improvements 
in the public health workforce and in data 
collection and reporting systems.
Due to PHEP funding, advances have 
also been made through the Public Health 
Information Network, a national initiative to 
improve the capacity of public health to use 
and exchange information electronically by 
CDC’s public health 
system support 
preparedness 







capable of reaching 
all individuals with 
effective assistance 
to address public 
health threats.
Public Health Preparedness:
A CDC Report on the 
 Public Health  Emergency Preparedness 
Cooperative Agreement
February 2008
Mobilizing State by State
For more information 
about progress and 
challenges in state public 
health preparedness, see 
CDC’s report, Public 
Health Preparedness: 
Mobilizing State by State at 
www.emergency.cdc.gov/
publications/feb08phprep.
CDC Report on State Preparedness Progress
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promoting the use of standards and defining 
technical requirements (see box on Health 
Alert Network). Standards and technical 
requirements are being determined by best 
practices to develop certification criteria for 
state and local public health departments that 
support both routine public health activities 
and emergency preparedness and response. 
Laboratories now have increased capability to 
test for biological and chemical threats and to 
communicate information.
In FY 2007, key CDC accomplishments to 
support state and local health departments 
included:
Increasing state and local health •	
departments’ access to CDC preparedness 
subject matter experts through additional 
field assignments and other customized 
technical assistance approaches;
Developing an evaluation framework and •	
related capacity and capability performance 
measures for incident management and 
crisis and emergency risk communication in 
conjuction with representatives from state 
and local public health agencies, national 
partner organizations, and others; and
Establishing an American Indian/Alaska •	
Native working group to strengthen 
relationships between tribal partners and 
state health departments and ensure access 
to CDC resources and programs dealing 
with preparedness issues.
Collaborating, training, and providing tools 
to enhance preparedness. CDC provides a 
wide range of resources to enhance preparedness 
at all levels of government. In FY 2007, TPER 
funding supported Centers for Public Health 
Preparedness, Advanced Practice Centers, 
radiological preparedness tools, Crisis and 
Emergency Risk Communication courses, 
products distributed by CDC’s Public Health 
Training Network, Meta-Leadership Summits 
for Preparedness, and blast injury trainings and 
materials. 
Source: CDC
Rhode Island Responds to a 
Mycoplasma Outbreak
In December 2006, Rhode Island set in motion emergency 
operation procedures in response to an outbreak of respiratory 
and neurologic illness due to Mycoplasma pneumoniae. The 
state and the city of Providence, in cooperation with the Rhode 
Island Department of Health and many state and local partners, 
used their Medical Emergency Distribution System plans to 
provide antibiotics to every person needing them. At the school 
where the infection was first identified, public health personnel 
dispensed preventive medications to nearly 1,200 students, 
faculty, staff, and their families. This occurred over the New 
Year’s holiday weekend, making access to personnel and materials more difficult.
The Rhode Island Department of Health’s success in containing this disease outbreak was partially 
due to the investments made in the medication distribution plan, risk communication, and Incident 
Command System training of all staff as part of its all-hazards approach to public health emergencies.
Health Alert Network
CDC’s Health Alert Network (HAN) 
functions as a health alert component to 
the Public Health Information Network to 
ensure that each community has prompt 
access to emergent health information. 
HAN provides information to state and 
local public health practitioners, clinicians, 
and public health laboratories about urgent 
health events. It also provides opportunities 
for public health professionals to network 
and share promising practices and lessons 
learned related to partner communications 
and alerting. The HAN messaging systems 
transmit health alerts, advisories, and updates 
to more than one million recipients.
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Centers for Public Health Preparedness Program. CDC 
manages the Centers for Public Health Preparedness 
program to strengthen preparedness by linking 
academic expertise to state and local health agency 
needs. This program brings together schools of public 
health and other university programs with a common 
focus on preparedness to establish a national network 
of academic-based programs that share expertise 
and resources across state and local jurisdictions. 
The Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act 
(December 2006) expanded the focus of the Centers 
for Public Health Preparedness work in FY 2009 to 
include the development of public health response 
core curricula and a research agenda. More than  
$10 million was recently awarded to seven accredited 
schools of public health for the establishment of 
Preparedness and Emergency Response Research 
Centers. The seven schools will conduct research 
that will evaluate the structure, capabilities, 
and performance of public health systems for 
preparedness and emergency response activities.52
In FY 2007, specific accomplishments for the Centers 
for Public Health Preparedness program included:
Conducting nearly 600 public health •	
preparedness education and training activities that 
reached more than 40,000 individuals. Activities 
included public health preparedness certificate 
programs, preparedness training for nurses 
and other hospital-based health professionals, 
exercise planning and evaluation, all-hazards web-
based distance learning, and National Incident 
Management System/Incident Command System 
courses.
Establishing a web-based Resource Center, •	
managed by the Association of Schools of Public 
Health, which offers nearly 1,500 educational 
programs and materials for adoption, adaptation, 
and use by the public.
Conducting 70 education and training activities •	
addressing tribal preparedness issues. 
Advanced Practice Centers. CDC provides funding 
and guidance to the National Association of County 
and City Health Officials to manage and implement 
the Advanced Practice Centers program. These eight 
centers participate in developing cutting-edge tools 
and resources to help local public health departments 
prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
emergencies. In FY 2007, these centers provided two-
day preparedness trainings to more than 500 local 
health departments.
Tools for Radiological Preparedness. CDC 
has developed several tools for state and local health 
departments to plan and prepare for a radiological 
emergency. These tools include guidance for 
radiological monitoring of the affected population; 
community reception (monitoring) center flow 
diagrams describing various recommended 
functional areas (e.g., general registration, medical 
care and transfer, radiation dose/medical assessment 
areas), staffing, and equipment needs for reception 
center operations; and a toolkit with just-in-
time and other training on roles and planning 
considerations for radiological/nuclear emergency 
preparedness. 
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Training. 
Emergencies can be chaotic; to avoid confusion and 
reduce uncertainty, messages communicated to the 
public must be accurate, fast, consistent, relevant, 
and empathetic. CDC’s Crisis and Emergency 
Risk Communication course provides essential 
knowledge and tools to navigate the harsh realities 
of communicating to the public, media, partners, 
and stakeholders during an intense public health 
emergency, including a terrorist event. The training 
course helps public health leaders understand the 
psychology of crisis communication. Practical, easy-
to-use templates, checklists, and source documents 
are provided for use before, during, and after a 
crisis. In addition to 22 training seminars (1,656 
participants) conducted at state and local public 
health departments and CDC in FY 2007, the 
online version of this training course53 extends the 
reach of these materials to the public. For details 
about a succesful response in which emergency risk 
communications played a role, see box at the bottom 
of page 42.
CDC-sponsored training courses help public 
health leaders learn how to communicate 
effectively during an emergency. 
Source: CDC
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Public Health Training Network. This network 
distributes educational and communication products 
to state and local officials who plan, detect, and 
respond to public health events. Products include 
interactive multimedia, videotapes, live audio 
conferences, and live satellite videoconferences 
as well as print-based self-instructional courses. 
CDC instructional specialists work with content 
experts at CDC and university schools of public 
health to develop these products for the public 
health workforce. This distance learning network 
is an efficient, effective, and economical way to 
share knowledge with public health professionals 
nationwide. In FY 2007, satellite broadcasts on mass 
antibiotic dispensing and emergency response for 
hospitals and treatment centers were conducted, as 
was training in WEBEOC, a software program used 
in emergency operation centers to manage crisis 
information.
Meta-Leadership Summits for Preparedness. An effective, 
integrated response to a public health emergency 
requires a variety of people and organizations working 
together. The objective of CDC’s Meta-Leadership 
Summit for Preparedness Initiative54 is to develop a 
cadre of business, government and nonprofit “leaders 
of leaders” who are capable of and committed to 
taking the reins during a crisis. These leaders learn 
problem-solving skills to prepare for and respond to 
a public health emergency. The summits also provide 
opportunities for leaders to build connections with 
other organizations to develop collaborative strategies 
for responding to events. CDC selectively targets 
leaders who are likely to benefit most due to their 
organizational position or expertise (approximately 
150 people per session).  
The initiative is conducted in partnership with 
the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative 
from the Harvard School of Public Health, the 
CDC Foundation, and the Robert Wood Johnson 
Foundation. In June 2007, the first pilot summit was 
conducted in Columbus, Georgia. Leaders attending 
the initial summit and the agencies they represent 
have already utilized the connections and skills gained 
from the summit during actual emergency events. The 
pilot phase55 is now complete, and summits are being 
planned to reach leaders in all 50 states.
Dr. Barry Dorn, Harvard School of Public Health, 
presents the Five Dimensions of Meta-Leadership 
at the Columbus, Georgia, Summit in June 2007. 
Blast Injury Trainings and Materials. Blast injuries from 
explosives present unique challenges to healthcare 
providers; people with blast injuries may not show 
any obvious external symptoms but may still be in 
serious danger. To help prepare the emergency medical 
community, CDC developed a training course for 
public health workers, “Bombings: Injury Patterns 
and Care,” based on lessons learned from cities such as 
London, Madrid, and Tel Aviv, that have experienced 
mass blast injuries. The course, developed as part of 
the Terrorism Injuries: Information, Dissemination, 
and Exchange Project and led by the American 
College of Emergency Physicians, was designed to 
help inform healthcare providers about blast injuries 
and their treatment. 
A pocket guide on bombing injuries and a poster on 
blast injury were also developed. More than 10,000 
copies of these materials have been disseminated. 
To increase knowledge about treating injuries from 
terrorist bombings, fact sheets on topics from crush 
injuries and burns to the treatment of children and 
older adults have been posted on the CDC website 
(www.emergency.cdc.gov/blastinjuries), and have been 
an integral part of CDC’s blast injury response efforts.
Strengthening legal preparedness for public health 
emergencies. Legal preparedness is an integral part of 
a systemwide response to public health emergencies. 
Public health officials and their partners in emergency 
response, which include law enforcement and other 
key agencies, need to have legal authority to gather 
and exchange surveillance data, conduct joint 
investigations, provide and receive assistance across 
jurisdictional lines, implement social distancing 
measures,56 and allocate scarce medical supplies. In 
addition, mutual aid agreements and memoranda 
of understanding must be in place to facilitate a 
coordinated, multijurisdictional response, and to have 
Source: CDC Foundation
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ready access to practical information on legal 
preparedness best practices.
CDC’s Public Health Law Program57 provides 
expert consultation to federal, state, and local 
public health agencies and develops products to 
assess and strengthen legal preparedness. Among 
these resources are training courses, checklists, 
public health law bench books for state courts, 
and the CDC Public Health Emergency Legal 
Preparedness Clearinghouse. The continually 
updated Clearinghouse contains the most 
comprehensive, online collection of information 
on laws, legal issues, and legal tools relevant to 
public health emergencies.
In FY 2007, key CDC accomplishments to 
strengthen public health emergency legal 
preparedness included:
Convening the National Summit on •	
Public Health Legal Preparedness where 
policymakers and public health practitioners 
shaped the National Action Agenda for 
Public Health Legal Preparedness. This 
agenda contained 100 action options for 
use by state, local, and tribal officials in 
strengthening their jurisdictions’ legal 
preparedness.
Updating the “Forensic Epidemiology” •	
training course to help public health and 
law enforcement agencies strengthen 
coordination of suspected bioterrorism 
attack investigations. The training course 
includes a new CDC-developed case study 
on coordinated implementation of pandemic 
influenza social distancing measures.
Updating the “Public Health Emergency •	
Law” training course for public health 
practitioners and emergency management 
professionals to improve understanding of the 
role of law as a public health tool. The update 
included a new case study on joint response 
to a toxic chemical spill.
Developing the “Model Memorandum of •	
Understanding (MOU) for Joint Public 
Health-Law Enforcement Investigations” 
and the “Guide for Developing MOUs 
for Public Health, Law Enforcement, 
Corrections, and the Judiciary: Coordinated 
Implementation of Community Response 
Measures to Control the Spread of Pandemic 
Respiratory Disease.” Both the Model MOU 
and the guide can be used by jurisdictions 
to strengthen cross-sector coordination in an 
emergency.
Developing the “Menu of Suggested •	
Provisions for Public Health Mutual Aid 
Agreements” and the regularly updated 
“Inventory of Mutual Aid Agreements and 
Related Resources.”
Challenges for Public Health System 
Support
Conducting program activities with decreasing 
resources. The public health system, including 
local, state, federal, and territorial public 
health departments and their partners, has 
made significant progress in preparedness.  
CDC continues this support but with reduced 
preparedness resources.  Base funding for 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
cooperative agreement has declined every year 
since fiscal year 2005 (see figure 4). This will 
necessitate increased collaboration and creativity 
in conducting program activities.  Decreasing 
resources will require difficult decisions as to 
which activities can no longer be supported.  
Continuing technical assistance on 
preparedness activities. States made progress in 
2007, notably on developing pandemic influenza 
plans. However, exercises are needed to validate 
these and other response plans and to make 
additional improvements. CDC plays a primary 
role in providing technical assistance at all stages 
of the preparedness cycle – planning, training, 
exercising, evaluating, and improving – and 
public health departments need the capability to 
sustain a preparedness system that includes all 
these components. This system should be ready 
to help vulnerable populations as well as the 
general public.
PHEP Cooperative Agreement Funding*
Fiscal Year 2005 Actual $857,337,000
Fiscal Year 2006 Actual $760,470,000
Fiscal Year 2007 Actual $712,919,000
Fiscal Year 2008 Enacted $700,465,000
*Does not include non-TPER pandemic influenza supplemental funding distributed 
in fiscal years 2005 through 2007.
Sources: Data from CDC and the Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Commit-
tee, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, Fiscal Years 2006 through 2009.
Figure 4: Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) 
cooperative agreement funding is on the decline.
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Retaining experienced public health response 
personnel. Public health preparedness is all about 
people. Ensuring that public health departments 
retain qualified response personnel is an ongoing 
challenge that could jeopardize staffing a sustained 
emergency response.
Bolstering legal preparedness for public health. 
All states are affected by public health emergencies, 
which led to the creation of the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). 
EMAC provides form and structure to interstate 
mutual aid. Through EMAC, a state impacted 
by a disaster can request and receive assistance 
from other member states quickly and efficiently, 
resolving two key issues upfront – liability and 
reimbursement. Although all states have joined 
EMAC, gaps remain such as resource sharing 
with provinces in Canada or Mexico. Appropriate 
mutual aid agreements with those governments 
need to be negotiated and implemented. 
Continuing to measure public health 
preparedness. To promote accountability as 
reinforced by the Pandemic and All-Hazards 
Preparedness Act (December 2006), performance 
measurement data are needed to assist CDC and 
public health departments in identifying specific 
improvements for response to and recovery from 
emergencies. Working in close collaboration 
with local, state, and federal partners, CDC 
has identified priority areas for performance 
measurement and is reviewing and revising 
existing performance measures as well as drafting 
new measures as needed. These measures will 
enable evaluation and reporting on the nation’s 
ability to prepare for and respond to public health 
emergencies. The measures will support the 
following:
Monitoring, for accountability purposes, the •	
extent to which public health departments are 
able to demonstrate performance on specific 
preparedness and response capabilities;
Identification of technical assistance needs for •	
program improvement; and
Demonstration of public health preparedness •	
and response capabilities through publications 
and presentations of data.

Addressing these challenges effectively will 
significantly impact progress in public health 
preparedness. One of these challenges, having 
experienced public health response personnel, is 
a cross-cutting issue faced within public health 
system support in addition to other core public 
health functions. For more information about 
the broader, cross-cutting challenges that CDC 
faces and priorities to address these challenges, see 
Chapter 7, “Moving Forward,” on page 47.
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Chapter 7: Moving Forward
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) plays a key role in 
preparing the nation for all types of public health 
emergencies. CDC’s preparedness efforts include 
activities receiving Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response (TPER) funding, as well 
as those that receive funding from other sources, 
such as dedicated funding for infectious diseases 
or environmental health activities. All CDC’s 
preparedness work builds on decades of science 
developed to promote public health.
Although much has been accomplished to 
enhance public health preparedness, many 
challenges still remain. Challenges within each 
of the core public health functions have been 
described in this report. CDC is prioritizing the 
allocation of resources for ongoing and future 
projects to respond to challenges that cut across 
multiple public health functions. Below are 
priorities of particular note that address cross-
cutting challenges as we move forward.
Strengthening public health preparedness at 
federal, state, and local levels in a climate of 
decreasing resources.  With the anticipated 
decline in TPER funding in FY 2009, CDC and 
state and local health departments must find 
new ways, including enhanced collaborations, 
to conduct program activities.  CDC may also 
have to make difficult decisions about what 
the highest priority preparedness activities are 
and what must be postponed.  Public health 
departments at state and local levels may have to 
make similar choices.  
Integrating biosurveillance systems and 
activities. Health professionals must be able to 
recognize potential health emergencies as early as 
possible to prevent human deaths and mitigate 
suffering. This capability requires surveillance 
and integration of timely health-related 
information so that situational awareness can 
be maintained and health threats detected and 
characterized early. 
Biosurveillance activities span across CDC’s core 
public health functions outlined in this report. 
These activities involve data collection (health 
monitoring and surveillance); data analysis, 
fusion, and use, including development of 
potential interventions (epidemiology
and other assessment sciences); creation and 
interpretation of laboratory tests to identify 
health threats (laboratory sciences and service); 
implementation and evaluation of interventions 
(response and recovery operations); and 
integration of all information and resources into 
every level of the public health system (public 
health system support). This health intelligence 
system ultimately will support the production of 
a near real-time, electronic, common operating 
picture of routine and emerging acute health 
problems that can be easily shared across federal, 
state, and local government public health 
authorities and clinicians. These capabilities will 
enhance early detection of, rapid response to, and 
management of public health emergencies.
Developing the emerging field of biosurveillance 
will require new tools, methods, and analytic 
capabilities to integrate data from multiple 
sources (e.g., from BioSense and the National 
Poison Data System) and create more actionable 
information. Other priorities include advancing 
the availability of electronic health information 
across the health system; enhancing global 
capability for early detection and situational 
awareness; developing greater laboratory 
innovation and connectivity to support improved 
detection and faster response; and enhancing the 
public health workforce so that biosurveillance 
information can be collected, managed, analyzed, 
and disseminated.
In response to Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive - 21 (HSPD-21), CDC established 
a Biosurveillance Coordination Unit to lead 
the development of a national strategy and 
implementation plan for next-generation 
biosurveillance capabilities, in collaboration 
with a wide range of public and private sector 
partners. The plan, expected in FY 2009, will 
provide a picture of both the current and future 
states of the nation’s biosurveillance capabilities 
and include a gap analysis to ensure that 
identified priorities provide the greatest value to 
stakeholders at all levels of government and the 
private sector.
Improving public health workforce surge 
capacity. The cornerstone of effective 
preparedness and response consists of skilled 
personnel with the right expertise and a sufficient 
CDC may have to make 
difficult decisions 
about what the highest 
priority preparedness 
activities are and what 
must be postponed. 
Public health 
departments at state 
and local levels may 
have to make similar 
choices. 
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number of qualified personnel to sustain surge 
operations during an incident. Although some 
progress has been made to build surge capacity 
(e.g., increased numbers of epidemiology staff 
at state and territorial health departments and 
increased numbers of CDC personnel identified, 
trained, and medically cleared to deploy to an 
event), improvements need to continue. 
CDC priorities for ongoing and future TPER-
funded projects include support for public 
health laboratory surge capacity and continued 
expansion of CDC’s pool of trained and 
available responders with expertise in a variety 
of areas, including epidemiology, emergency 
communications, informatics, emergency 
management, and other specialties.
Helping vulnerable populations. Successful 
planning and response to public health hazards 
require protecting the health and safety of 
vulnerable populations before, during, and after 
emergencies. Identifying strategies that provide 
effective interventions to protect vulnerable 
populations is an ongoing effort. 
To strengthen assistance to these populations, 
CDC priorities include research projects such 
as developing an evidence base of effective 
public health interventions. Another priority is 
ensuring that the needs of vulnerable populations 
are included in CDC response planning and 
exercising. Ethical planning and response require 
meaningful engagement of the entire population, 
particularly those who are most vulnerable to 
the impact of the event, as early in the planning 
process as possible. CDC requested that the 
Ethics Subcommittee of the CDC Advisory 
Committee to the Director develop a white 
paper examining ethical issues and considerations 
for public health emergency preparedness and 
response. These issues include meeting the special 
needs of vulnerable populations in preparedness 
planning and response activities. In addition, 
CDC commissioned five focus papers that 
explore issues related to professional, civic, and 
personal obligations; research in emergency 
settings; vulnerable populations; ethical issues 
related to stockpiling; and public engagement. 
The white paper and focus papers are scheduled 
to be published in 2009.58
Enhancing capabilities for specific public 
health emergency scenarios.  CDC’s priorities 
for ongoing and future preparedness and 
response projects include expanding key 
capabilities for specific scenarios. Some of these 
priorities promote projects that support response 
planning and exercising, particularly for threats 
that have not been included in previous exercises. 
Other priorities address scenario-specific 
response including improved laboratory methods 
and capabilities for chemical and infectious 
agents and radiological materials, and for testing  
environmental samples. Also, CDC’s priorities 
include support for improving laboratory surge 
capacity for scenario-specific events, particularly 
for radiation emergencies and environmental 
investigations.
A Continuing Commitment to 
Preparedness
CDC’s work in preparedness continues to 
evolve as improvements are made across the core 
public health functions and as new challenges 
emerge. CDC’s investments in preparedness 
resulted in significant accomplishments in FY 
2007, but there is much left to do. To have a 
strong platform for rapid and effective public 
health emergency response, CDC will continue 
to build its internal response capabilities and to 
strengthen external response capabilities through 
financial and/or technical support of partners 
at the local, state, tribal, territorial, federal, and 
international levels.
CDC will continue 
to build its internal 
response capabilities 





of partners at the 
local, state, tribal, 
territorial, federal, and 
international levels.
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Appendix 1: Overview of CDC 
Preparedness Activities
The mission of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities is to prevent death, disability, disease, and injury associated with 
urgent health threats by improving preparedness of the public health system, the healthcare delivery 
system, and the public. CDC has made all-hazards preparedness and emergency response a priority and 
is building and enhancing systems at local, state, and federal levels. For more information, see CDC’s 
Emergency and Response website (www.emergency.cdc.gov).
CDC’s Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (COTPER) 
coordinates terrorism preparedness and emergency response activities across CDC and strategically 
distributes funds to other CDC coordinating centers and offices, and the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). COTPER comprises the following divisions and offices:
The •	 Division of State and Local Readiness (DSLR) administers the Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative agreement, which funds state and local efforts to strengthen their 
abilities to respond to public health emergencies and provides technical assistance to promote these 
efforts.
The •	 Division of Strategic National Stockpile (DSNS) operates and maintains the Strategic National 
Stockpile, a national repository of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support 
medications, and medical supplies. During a public health emergency, state and local public health 
systems and resources may become overwhelmed. The Stockpile is designed to supplement and 
resupply state and local public health departments in the event of such an emergency. DSNS also 
provides technical assistance to local officials to help ensure that local, state, and federal agencies can 
work together to receive, stage, store, and distribute Stockpile assets.
The•	  Division of Emergency Operations (DEO) coordinates CDC’s preparedness, assessment, 
response, recovery, and evaluation prior to and during public health emergencies. DEO has overall 
responsibility for the CDC Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC), which maintains 
situational awareness of potential health threats 24 hours a day and is the centralized location for 
event management when activated. The DEOC is equipped with state-of-the-art communications 
technologies to support information pipelines with state, federal, and international partners.
The •	 Division of Select Agents and Toxins (DSAT), through the Select Agent Program, regulates the 
possession, use, and transfer of biological agents and toxins (select agents) that have the potential to 
pose a severe threat to public health and safety. This program is designed to ensure compliance with 
the select agent regulations by providing guidance and evaluating and inspecting registered entities.
The •	 Office of the Director (OD) manages strategy, budget formulation, policy, workforce and career 
planning, communication, research, and science for terrorism preparedness and emergency response 
activities. In addition, OD manages the Career Epidemiology Field Officer program, which 
recruits and supports skilled epidemiologists in state and local public health departments. Through 
this program, public health departments can choose to spend PHEP cooperative agreement 
funds to support a field officer in their agencies. OD also manages the Centers for Public Health 
Preparedness program, a national network of colleges and universities that collaborates with state 
and local agencies and other community partners to provide preparedness education and training 
resources to the public health workforce, healthcare providers, students, and others based on 
community need.
Emergency preparedness and response is a collective effort among the different offices and centers at 
CDC. In addition to the programs that COTPER manages directly, other CDC organizations and 
programs make significant contributions to emergency preparedness and response. The organizations 
and programs that follow receive Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response funding and/or 
funding from other sources. 
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Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention (CCEHIP)
CCEHIP plans, directs, and coordinates public health research, programs, and laboratory sciences 
that improve health and eliminate illness, disability, and/or death caused by injuries or environmental 
exposures. CCEHIP conducts public health preparedness activities through two national centers.
The •	 National Center for Environmental Health/Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
(NCEH/ATSDR) conducts ongoing projects to improve surveillance systems, laboratory capacity, 
and emergency response. NCEH/ATSDR is improving various surveillance systems for chemical 
exposures, hazardous substance spills, and morbidity following disasters. NCEH/ATSDR also 
works with state and local public health departments to improve response to chemical, nuclear, and 
radiologic terrorism.
The •	 National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (NCIPC) links to the injury care community 
to decrease morbidity and mortality from injuries caused by explosions. NCIPC is moving toward 
this goal through curriculum development for healthcare providers, development of clinical 
guidance resources for management of blast injuries, and translation of lessons learned from 
international and U.S. military experience. NCIPC is also working to improve surveillance systems 
for blast injuries due to bombings and behavioral/mental health outcomes associated with disasters 
and incidents of mass violence and is providing educational materials to prevent or reduce the 
impact of these events on mental health and behavioral health outcomes.
Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service (CCHIS)
CCHIS provides leadership and promotes innovation in public health informatics, health statistics, 
health marketing, and scientific communications. The national centers within CCHIS support CDC’s 
emergency communication objectives in several ways. 
The •	 National Center for Health Marketing (NCHM) strengthens health communications networks 
across federal, state, and local levels with such projects as Epi-X and the Public Health Training 
Network. NCHM’s Emergency Communication Branch provides leadership for cross-agency 
emergency risk communication during emergencies and ensures that CDC coordinates with state 
and local public health departments in providing critical health protection information to the 
public, clinicians, emergency responders, and other stakeholders. 
The•	  National Center for Public Health Informatics (NCPHI) coordinates BioSense, the near real-time 
biosurveillance system that provides health situational awareness using existing data from healthcare 
organizations across the country. Through the Public Health Information Network, NCPHI 
provides technical assistance and guidance to state and local partners to implement public health 
information systems for the exchange of data across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. 
The •	 National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) develops and conducts data collection activities to 
monitor the nation’s health and provides expertise in data collection and analysis to state and local 
partners through collaborative efforts.  
Coordinating Center for Health Promotion (CoCHP)
CoCHP seeks to increase the potential for full, satisfying, and productive living across the lifespan for 
all people in all communities. CoCHP preparedness activities include providing technical expertise 
in epidemiology, surveillance, and communications during emergencies for populations with physical 
and developmental disabilities and chronic diseases, pregnant and lactating women, reproductive-age 
women, infants, the elderly, and school-age children. The national centers in CoCHP have specific 
responsibilities related to these activities. 
The •	 National Center on Birth Defects and Developmental Disabilities (NCBDDD) is conducting 
ongoing projects to develop and strengthen intramural research and surveillance capacity related to 
emergency preparedness for at-risk populations.
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The •	 National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion (NCCDPHP) has 
produced a number of publications addressing issues surrounding persons with chronic diseases 
following natural disasters.  
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases (CCID)
CCID strives to protect the public’s health by preventing and controlling infectious diseases. CCID’s 
ongoing public health preparedness activities include developing vaccines, improving diagnostic 
methods for select bioterrorism agents, and improving the Laboratory Response Network. 
The •	 Influenza Coordination Unit (ICU) ensures that the diverse activities related to pandemic or 
seasonal influenza preparedness and response activities are coordinated, effective, and efficient. ICU 
works with other CDC divisions and offices to continuously improve the CDC Pandemic Influenza 
Operations Plan, plan and participate in agencywide exercises, and manage portfolios of related 
pandemic influenza projects. 
The •	 National Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases (NCIRD), as part of the Anthrax 
Vaccine Research Program, is conducting a large-scale human clinical trial of the anthrax vaccine, 
as well as further immunological studies in animals. NCIRD is providing CDC leadership for the 
revision of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices guidelines for use of the anthrax 
vaccine. NCIRD is also collaborating in developing and evaluating alternative treatment strategies 
for inhalation anthrax.
The •	 National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases (NCZVED) is working to 
improve surveillance, diagnostic and molecular methods, and laboratory capacities for a number 
of select bioterrorism agents, including smallpox, botulism, and plague. NCZVED also seeks to 
quicken the detection and response to bioterrorism agents in water and food.
The •	 National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases (NCPDCID) 
manages the Laboratory Response Network, the global consortium of reference and national 
laboratories whose goal is to decrease the time needed to detect biological and chemical agents 
that can harm the public and respond to these events with detection and identification capacities 
and surveillance support. The Division of Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response is primarily 
responsible for managing the Laboratory Response Network and preparedness activities within 
CCID. In addition, NCPDCID tests the continuing effectiveness of existing drugs against 
bioterrorism agents and prepares U.S. ports of entry to reduce the risk of natural or intentional 
introduction of infectious diseases into the country. 
Coordinating Office for Global Health (COGH)
COGH provides leadership and works with global partners to increase life expectancy and quality of 
life and also to increase global preparedness to prevent and control natural and manmade threats to 
health. 
The Global Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response program is developing a pre-event •	
strategy for CDC’s external engagements with international public health partners in terrorism 
preparedness and emergency response. 
COGH also coordinates international response with the Director’s Emergency Operations Center •	
during international emergency response events and serves as the principal CDC point of contact 
for CDC programs, federal agencies, foreign governments, and other organizations concerned with 
international terrorism preparedness and response.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
NIOSH provides leadership to prevent work-related illness, injury, and death through information 
gathering, scientific research, and translation of knowledge into products and services. The NIOSH 
Emergency Preparedness and Response Office is the focal point for technical expertise; rapid and specific 
on-site support; and advance research and collaboration to enhance preparedness and response efforts. 
53Public Health Preparedness:





CDC Office of the Director (OD)
OD manages and directs the activities of CDC and coordinates the CDC response to emergencies. 
Public health preparedness activities within the OD include security, legal preparedness, and workforce 
training. OD also coordinates the placement of senior management officials (SMOs), who function as 
the chief CDC representatives within selected states. SMOs oversee CDC resources, provide technical 
assistance, and serve as a point of contact during emergencies. In 2007, 11 states and Washington, 
D.C., had permanent SMOs, and five states and two territories had SMOs who provide support only 
during an emergency. The following OD offices participate in CDC preparedness activities:
The •	 Office of the Chief Operating Officer (OCOO) ensures that federal assets and critical 
infrastructure are safeguarded by providing security for CDC facilities and the Strategic National 
Stockpile. OCOO also manages secure intelligence communication systems and HealthImpact.net 
(an internal CDC system) to support terrorism preparedness projects.
The •	 Office of the Chief of Public Health Practice (OCPHP) is responsible for the legal basis of CDC 
preparedness programs and ensures coordination and synergy of preparedness activities within CDC 
and with numerous partners. Activities in support of the mission are carried out through programs 
and offices focused on public health law, public health system standards, agency accreditation, and 
surveillance for emerging issues in public health practice.
The •	 Office of the Chief Science Officer (OCSO) leads the agency in scientific vision by enhancing 
the relevance, quality, and integrity of science and by fostering successful scientific collaborations. 
At the request of the CDC Director, OCSO is the agency’s approving authority of Emergency 
Use Authorization (EUA) submitted on behalf of CDC. OCSO assists CDC programs with 
oversight and review of EUA processes. If an emerging public health threat is identified for which 
no licensed or approved product exists, the Project BioShield Act of 2004 authorizes the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) commissioner to issue an EUA for the rapid dissemination 
of promising countermeasures for the protection and safety of the U.S. population.  Specifically, 
these countermeasures can be used for the diagnosis, treatment, or prevention of serious or life-
threatening diseases or for conditions caused by chemical, biologic, or radiologic agents for which 
no adequate, approved, or available alternatives exist.  CDC plays a critical role in ensuring 
the public’s safety by providing scientific expertise and leadership regarding the risk/benefit 
assessment of these countermeasures.  CDC also provides support for the distribution of medical 
countermeasures stored in the Strategic National Stockpile formulary.  CDC, in conjunction with 
National Institutes of Health, also provides expert consultation to the FDA commissioner regarding 
the appropriateness of EUA requests.
The •	 Office of Enterprise Communication (OEC) promotes effective and efficient communication 
networks both within CDC and with external partners, including the media. During an emergency 
situation that requires a CDC response, OEC provides information and communication support 
within the Joint Information Center located in the Director’s Emergency Operations Center. 
The •	 Office of Workforce and Career Development (OWCD) plans, directs, and manages workforce 
training programs for public health preparedness. The Epidemic Intelligence Service trains high-
level epidemiologists for placement at CDC and in state and local public health departments. 
Management personnel and staff of the Laboratory Response Network reference laboratories are also 
trained in preparedness, select agent regulations, and testing protocols. The CDC University School 
of Preparedness and Emergency Response provides instructional offerings to support current and 
future training requirements of CDC responders. 
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Appendix 2: TPER Funding Information
Sources: Data from CDC and the Justification of Estimates for Appropriation Committee, Fiscal Year 2006 through 2009, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services,  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response Budget for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2008
Terrorism – Budget Authority  
Budget Activity/Description FY 2005 Actual FY 2006 Actual FY 2007 Actual FY 2008 Enacted
Upgrading State and Local Capacity $919,148,000 $823,099,000 $766,660,000 $746,039,000
BT/Public Health Emergency •	
Preparedness Cooperative 
Agreement
$857,337,000 $760,470,000 $712,919,000 $700,465,000
Centers for Public Health •	
Preparedness $29,425,000     $30,669,000  $29,063,000 $28,555,000
Advanced Practice Centers•	 $5,424,000 $5,342,000 $5,355,000 $5,261,000
All Other State and Local •	
Capacity $26,962,000 $26,618,000 $19,323,000 $11,758,000
Upgrading CDC Capacity $140,972,000 $136,504,000 $122,928,000 $120,744,000
Anthrax $16,666,000  $13,851,000 $12,405,000 $7,882,000
Botulinum Toxin Research — — $2,963,000          —
Biosurveillance Initiative $79,271,000 $133,380,000 $71,249,000 $53,281,000
BioSense•	 $57,871,000 $57,208,000 $52,005,000 $34,389,000
BioSense (DOD)•	 —  $35,000,000 — —
Quarantine•	 $11,190,000 $11,068,000 $10,062,000 $9,870,000
Quarantine (DOD)•	 —  $20,000,000 — —
Real Time Lab Reporting•	 $10,210,000 $10,104,000  $9,182,000 $9,022,000
Strategic National Stockpile $466,700,000 $524,339,000 496,348,000 $551,509,000
Total, Terrorism $1,622,757,000 $1,631,173,000 $1,472,553,000 $1,479,455,000
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Appendix 3: Data Sources 
Data presented in this report come from a variety of sources. The purpose of the information below is to provide additional details about data sources for the programs and/or activities referenced in 
this report.  
CDC
Bacterial Diseases data; fiscal year (FY) 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, 
National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, Division of Vector-Borne Infectious 
Diseases, Bacterial Diseases Branch
BioSense data; FY 2007 and calendar year (CY) 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Health 
Information and Service, National Center for Public Health Informatics; Division of Integrated 
Surveillance Systems and Services
Biotechnology Core Facility data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, 
National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases, Division of Scientific 
Resources, Biotechnology Core Facility Branch 
Bioterrorism-related Anthrax data; 2001, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, National 
Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases  
Career Epidemiology Field Officer (CEFO) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response, Office of the Director
Centers for Public Health Preparedness (CPHP) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for 
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Division of State and Local Readiness
Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness 
and Emergency Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile
Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for 
Health Information and Service, National Center for Health Marketing
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Health 
Information and Service, National Center for Health Marketing 
Director’s Emergency Operations Center (DEOC) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for 
Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Division of Emergency Operations 
Early Aberration Reporting System (EARS) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious 
Diseases, National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases, Division of 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Enteric Diseases Laboratory Preparedness data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious 
Diseases, National Center for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, Division of Foodborne, 
Bacterial and Mycotic Diseases, Enteric Diseases Laboratory Preparedness Branch 
Epi-X data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service, National Center 
for Health Marketing 
Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) data, FY 2007 and CY 2007, CDC, Office of the Director, Office 
of Workforce and Career Development 
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance (HSEES) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating 
Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, 
Office of the Director 
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Laboratory Response Network (LRN) data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious 
Diseases, National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious Diseases, Division of 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response 
Laboratory Sciences data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury 
Prevention, National Center for Environmental Health, Division of Laboratory Sciences 
Parasitic Diseases data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, National Center 
for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, Division of Parasitic Diseases, Parasitic Diseases 
Branch 
Poxvirus Program data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, National Center 
for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Poxvirus 
and Rabies Branch  
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement data; 1999-2007, CDC, Coordinating 
Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response, Division of State and Local Readiness
Public Health Law data; FY 2007, CDC, Office of the Director, Office of the Chief of Public Health 
Practice 
Quarantine and Migration Health System data; FY 2007 and CY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center 
for Infectious Diseases, National Center for Preparedness, Detection, and Control of Infectious 
Diseases
Select Agents and Toxins data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, Division of Select Agents and Toxins
Special Pathogens data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases, National Center 
for Zoonotic, Vector-Borne, and Enteric Diseases, Division of Viral and Rickettsial Diseases, Special 
Pathogens Branch 
Strategic National Stockpile data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, Division of Strategic National Stockpile
Strategy and Innovation data; FY 2007, CDC, Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and 
Emergency Response, Strategy and Innovation Office 
ASTHO
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO). 2007 State Public Health Workforce 
Survey Results. Available at www.astho.org/pubs/WorkforceReport.pdf.
CSTE
Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE). 2006 National Assessment of Epidemiological 
Capacity. Available at www.cste.org/ECA.asp. 
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Health Monitoring and Surveillance
 
Assessing Public Emergency Knowledge, 
Attitudes, and Behaviors
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
BioSense Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service
Hazardous Substances Emergency Events 
Surveillance (HSEES) System
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Improving Coordination of Federal, State, and 
Local Public Health Morbidity Surveillance After 
Disasters
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Improving Public Health Surveillance of Chemical 
Exposures and Other Potential Health Hazards
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Infection Control and Healthcare Response 
Surveys Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences
 
Anthrax Immune Globulin Development (AIG) Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Anthrax Vaccine Research Program Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Assessing the Special Needs of Vulnerable 
Populations: Data to Inform Emergency 
Response Efforts 
Coordinating Center for Health Promotion 
Career Epidemiology Field Officer (CEFO) 
Program
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Coordinated Systems for Managing Outbreaks 
and Health Events (OMS)
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
Developing a Probabilistic Sampling Tool Kit for 
Initial Response Sampling 
National Institute for Occupational Safety  
and Health
Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) - 
Communications Project
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Evaluation of Compliance with Emergency 
Communication Interventions
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
MedKits Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Appendix 4: TPER-Funded Projects for 
Fiscal Year 2007
The table below is a listing of the Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (TPER)-funded projects 
in fiscal year 2007 within the following five core public health functions:
1) Health Monitoring and Surveillance, 2) Epidemiology and Other Assessment Sciences, 3) Public Health 
Laboratory Science and Service, 4) Response and Recovery Operations, and 5) Public Health System Support.
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Modeling Health Dynamics in Emergencies Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention
Providing a Competent Workforce in 
Epidemiologic Science and Public Health to CDC 
and State and Local Partners (EIS)
CDC Office of the Director
Reducing Adverse Impacts from Prolonged 
School Closure Due to Emerging Threats 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Public Health Laboratory Science and Service
 
An Integrated Approach for Coxiella burnetii  
(Q Fever) Preparedness Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Antimicrobial Susceptibility and Phenotypic 
Testing Methods for Bacterial Agents of 
Bioterrorism 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Bioterrorism – Special Pathogen Branch Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Bioterrorism Environmental Sampling Methods 
and Analysis Research Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Bioterrorism Preparedness for Rickettsia Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Bioterrorism Vaccine Safety - Anthrax Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Botulism: Molecular Methods Development Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
CDC Mass Spectrometry Toxin Laboratory: 
Develop and Validate Methods for Confirmation 
of Toxins
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Chemical Terrorism: Laboratory Training; 
Proficiency Testing; and Exercises for State, 
Local, and Territorial Public Health Laboratories
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Consolidated Support Projects for Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Database Development and Records 
Management
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Detection and Response to Bioterrorism Agents 
in Water, Food, and Environmental Samples Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Determination of the Risk of Bacillus anthracis 
Spore Resuspension from Envelopes 
Contaminated by the Anthrax Containing Leahy 
Letter 
National Institute for Occupational Safety  
and Health
Development of Novel Molecular Tools for 
Genotyping Bacillus anthracis - Molecular 
Epidemiology
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Division of Select Agents and Toxin’s Program 
Administration
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Drinking Water Disinfection of Bacterial Select 
Agents Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Enhance CDC Laboratory Readiness and 
Response to Intentional Botulism Events Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Enhancement of Proficiency Testing of the LRN 
Laboratories to Perform Bioterrorism Related 
Diagnostics 
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Establishing GMP Regulatory Production 
Capacity and a Quality Assurance Program for 
CDC-Prepared Reagents for Bioterrorism and 
Other Public Health Emergencies
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Expansion of National Botulism Toxin Testing 
Capacity Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Global Health Security Action Group Laboratory 
Network Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Improved Capacity for Diagnosis and Detection 
of Plague and Tularemia Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Inspection and Registration Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Lab Response and Surge Capacity Readiness 
for Plague and Tularemia Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Laboratory Capacity for Category A Agent 
Smallpox and Related Human Pathogenic 
Orthopoxviruses: Nucleic Acid Diagnostic 
Methodologies
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Laboratory Response Network (LRN) - National 
Asset for Preparedness and Response Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
LRN Reagents Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
LRN Real Time Laboratory Information Exchange Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service 
LRN Reference Laboratory Terrorism 
Preparedness Training CDC Office of the Director
LRN Sentinel Laboratory Terrorism Preparedness 
Training through the National Laboratory Training 
Network
CDC Office of the Director
Maintain LRN Reference Laboratories at Arctic 
Investigations Program Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Mass Spectrometry Expanded Toxin Research Coordinating Center for Environmental Health and Injury Prevention
National Interagency Biodefense Campus Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Novel Molecular Methods for Rapid Detection 
and Viability Determination of Select Agents Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Pathology Readiness and Capacity Building for 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
PulseNet Surveillance System for Y. pestis and  
F. tularensis Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Rapid Molecular Detection of Antimicrobial 
Resistance Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Select Agent Training for LRN Reference 
Laboratories CDC Office of the Director
Smallpox Vaccine Research Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Smallpox-functional Genomics of 
Orthopoxviruses Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Specimen Tracking and Results Reporting 
System 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Upgrading and Maintaining CDC Laboratory 
Capacity to Respond to Chemical and 
Radiological Terrorism
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Response and Recovery Operations
 
CDC Emergency Responder Training and 
TOPOFF 4 Exercise 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Competency-based Responder Training CDC Office of the Director
Constructing the CDC Corporate University’s 
School of Preparedness and Emergency 
Response
CDC Office of the Director
Countermeasures and Response Administration Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service  
Director’s Emergency Operations Center Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Director’s Emergency Operations Center IT and 
Informatics Support 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
Division Coordination Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Division of Emergency Operations - Office of the 
Director
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Emergency Communication System Information 
Management Team
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Emergency Communication Strategic and 
Organizational Planning and Management 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Website
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
Enhancing the Ability of Federal, State, and Local 
Public Health Agencies to Respond to Nuclear or 
Radiological Terrorism
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Epidemic Information Exchange (Epi-X) 
Advancement 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service
Geographic Research, Analysis, and Services 
Program for Planning During Emergency 
Response
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Global Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency 
Response Coordinating Office for Global Health
Improving Environmental Public Health 
Emergency Response
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Inventory Management and Acquisition Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication 
System CDC Office of the Director
Logistics Support Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
National Public Health Information Coalition Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service 
NIOSH Emergency Preparedness and Response 
Support
National Institute for Occupational Safety  
and Health
Plans, Training, and Exercising Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Preparedness Activities Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Public Response Hotline and Clinician 
Information Line
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Regulatory Affairs Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Response and Investigation Capacity Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Security of the Strategic National Stockpile CDC Office of the Director
Smallpox Vaccine Purchase Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Technical Advisory Response Unit Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Terrorism Preparedness at U.S. Ports Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Translation Services for Emergency Information Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service  
Upgrade Capacity for Rapid Ecological 
Deployment and Response for Plague and 
Tularemia
Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Public Health System Support
 
Advanced Practice Centers Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Automated Disaster and Emergency Planning 
Tool - Building a Platform for Technical 
Assistance for States
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
CCID Preparedness Goals Management Coordinating Center for Infectious Diseases
Centers for Public Health Preparedness Program Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
COTPER Business Services Office Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
COTPER Goals Management Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
COTPER Office of the Director Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
DeKalb County Police CDC Office of the Director
Development of the Preparedness Goal Action 
Plan: Establishment of Environmental Health 
Scenario Goal Team Leader and Scenario Goal 
Team Leads for Preparedness 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
Enterprise Communication Technology Platform Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service 
HealthImpact.net - Terrorism System Support Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
Informatics Technical Assistance Group for PHEP 
Cooperative Agreement Grantees
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service 
Management, Oversight, and Program Services Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response
National Preparedness Leadership Institute CDC Office of the Director
National Public Health Radio Network Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service
Preparedness Agreements with Key Public 
Health Associations 
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Preparedness Strategic Marketing and 
Partnering Plan 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
Cooperative Agreement (Bioterrorism 
Cooperative Agreement)
Coordinating Office for Terrorism 
Preparedness and Emergency Response
Public Health Training Network: Ensuring 
Functionality
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service  
Risk Communication Capacity Building for State 
and Local Partners 
Coordinating Center for Health Information 
and Service
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FY 2007 TPER Projects by 
Functional Category
        CDC Coordinating Center/
           National Center/Office
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness: 
2007 CDC Public Health Emergency Legal 
Preparedness Summit 
CDC Office of the Director
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness: 
Ensuring Key Legal Competencies for Front-Line 
Practitioners during Public Health Emergencies
CDC Office of the Director
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness: 
Improving Emergency Response Coordination 
between Public Health, Law Enforcement, 
Corrections, and the Judiciary
CDC Office of the Director
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness: New 
State Isolation and Quarantine Laws CDC Office of the Director
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness: the 
Public Health Legal Preparedness Clearinghouse CDC Office of the Director
Strenthening Emergency Preparedness: 
COTPER Mutual Aid Agreement Requirements CDC Office of the Director
Terrorism Injuries: Information Dissemination and 
Exchange 
Coordinating Center for Environmental Health 
and Injury Prevention
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1 The timeframe for fiscal year 2007 is October 1, 2006, through September 30, 2007, the most recent 
budget period for which complete data were available.  
2 For more information about the progress and challenges in state and local preparedness, see CDC’s 
report, Public Health Preparedness: Mobilizing State by State at www.emergency.cdc.gov/publications/
feb08phprep.
3 This funding consists of the following congressional budget lines: Upgrading State and Local Capacity 
(including the Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement), the Strategic National 
Stockpile, Upgrading CDC Capacity, Biosurveillance, Anthrax, and Botulinum Toxin Research.  This 
figure does not include non-TPER projects, such as pandemic influenza preparedness.
4 Figure based on estimated obligations fiscal year 2004 through 2008.  
5 Available at www.emergency.cdc.gov/publications/feb08phprep.
6 Drawing on the definition provided in the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act, 2006, HHS has 
adopted the following definition of at-risk individuals. The term “at-risk individuals” is interchangeable 
with terms like “special needs populations” and “vulnerable populations.” Before, during, and after an 
incident, members of at-risk populations may have additional needs in one or more of the following 
functional areas: maintaining independence, communication, transportation, supervision, and medical 
care. In addition to those individuals specifically recognized as at-risk in the statute, i.e., children, senior 
citizens, and pregnant women, individuals who may need additional response assistance include those 
who have disabilities, live in institutionalized settings, are from diverse cultures, have limited English 
proficiency or are non-English speaking, are transportation-disadvantaged, have chronic medical 
disorders, or have pharmacological dependency.
7 See note 2.
8 References to CDC also apply to the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and 
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
9 More information about public health threats is provided on page 12.
10 See note 1.
11 Institute of Medicine. Research Priorities in Emergency Preparedness and Response for Public Health Systems. 
A Letter Report. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2008. Available at www.iom.edu/
CMS/3740/48812/50685.aspx.
12 As specified in Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF #8) – Public Health and Medical Services Annex 
of the National Response Framework. Available at www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpesf8.htm. 
13 Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response website (www.hhs.gov/aspr).
14 See note 6.
15 Originally established as the Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency Response (OTPER) 
in August 2002 and renamed the Coordinating Office for Terrorism Preparedness and Emergency 
Response (COTPER) in 2005 during a CDC reorganization.
16 See note 3. 
17 See Appendix 4 for a listing of all TPER-funded projects for fiscal year 2007.  
18 See note 2.
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Endnotes
19 The National Response Framework utilizes the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) as part 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Preparedness and Response, 
under Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF #8), Health and Medical Services, to support federal 
agencies in the management and coordination of the federal medical response to major emergencies 
and federally declared disasters.  NDMS responds by providing teams, supplies, and equipment; 
moving patients from a disaster site to unaffected areas of the nation; and providing care at 
participating hospitals in unaffected areas.
20 Federated database technologies support data sharing across a large community despite data being 
stored in different geographic locations. 
21 External contamination occurs when radioactive material, in the form of dust, powder, or liquid, 
comes into contact with a person’s skin, hair, or clothing.  In other words, the contact is external 
to a person’s body.  Internal contamination occurs when people swallow or breathe in radioactive 
materials or when radioactive materials enter the body through an open wound or are absorbed 
through the skin.
22 “Route of vaccine administration” refers to the ways vaccines can be introduced into the body, such 
as being injected beneath the skin (subcutaneously) or into a muscle (intramuscularly).  
23 More information about the MedKit evaluation is available at www.emergency.cdc.gov/agent/
anthrax/prep/pdf/medkit-evaluation-summary-2007.pdf.
24 The Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists results comprise responses from all 50 states, 
the District of Columbia, and four territories and jurisdictions (American Samoa, Northern 
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and U.S. Virgin Islands). 
25 The EPI-AID mechanism is a means for Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officers, along with 
other CDC staff, to provide technical support to state health agencies requesting assistance for 
epidemiologic field investigations (disease outbreaks or health emergencies).
26 See note 6.
27 All members of the LRN for biological agents can perform tests for these agents, and members 
of the LRN for chemical terrorism can either test for a set of chemical agents or safely ship these 
agents to another laboratory.
28 Public Law 107–188.  The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act 
of 2002.
29 Entities consist of academic, commercial, nonprofit, and government organizations.  
30 A list of select agents is available at www.selectagents.gov/agentToxinList.htm.
31 Internal contamination occurs when people swallow or breathe in radioactive materials, or when 
radioactive materials enter the body through an open wound or are absorbed through the skin.
32 Public Health Laboratory Preparedness: Ready, Set, Respond. An APHL Report on the Preparedness 
of State Public Health Laboratories, May 2008.  Available at http://www.aphl.org/AboutAPHL/
publications/Documents/All_Hazards_2008.pdf.
33 The first DEOC (DEOC 1) was opened in January 2003 and the new DEOC facility (DEOC 21) 
became operational in February 2006.  
34 CDC’s Coordinating Office for Global Health works with international partners to improve global 
preparedness and response to major public health threats, serves as the lead international point of 
contact, and helps to coordinate international emergency responses.
35 This capability is provided through the aircraft dedicated to emergency operations responses 
managed by the Division of Emergency Operations. In addition, the Division of Strategic 
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National Stockpile manages two aircraft, which are dedicated to support simultaneous unplanned 
deployments of Strategic National Stockpile assets and response teams anywhere in the country 
within 12 hours.
36 The EPI-AID mechanism is a means for Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) officers, along with 
other CDC staff, to provide technical support to state health agencies requesting assistance for 
epidemiologic field investigations (disease outbreaks or health emergencies).
37 MEDEVAC is the air transport of persons to a place where they can receive medical or surgical care.
38 Infectious means capable of causing an infection, usually by a pathologic microorganism. 
Contagious means that the disease is transmissible by direct and indirect contact.
39 The Incident Command System (ICS) is the organizational structure for managing incidents that 
require response from different jurisdictions and disciplines.  ICS lays out standard roles and 
responsibilities for the incident commander and staff.
40 See note 4.  
41 The latest scientific data are from the Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures 
Enterprise (PHEMCE), a coordinated interagency effort by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
Preparedness and Response (ASPR) that includes three primary HHS internal agencies: CDC, U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, and National Institutes of Health.  
42 Large metropolitan public health departments are part of the Cities Readiness Initiative (CRI).  
43 Successful examples of partnerships include Business Executives for National Security and the 
United States Postal Service.
44 Institute of Medicine. Quarantine Stations at Ports of Entry Protecting the Public’s Health. 
Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2005. Available at www.iom.edu/
CMS/3793/22845/29602.aspx.
45 See Section 361 of the Public Health Service Act.
46 This program was previously referred to as the Clinician Registry.
47 Acehanese, Bahasa Indonesia, Creole, Dutch, Hmong (Hmoob), Japanese, Khmer/Cambodian, Lao, 
Portuguese, Somali, Swahili, Thai, and Ukrainian.
48 Extended hours are defined as 12 hours to 16 hours a day during a response.




50 Institute of Medicine. The Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System: Emergency 
Medical Services at the Crossroads. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2006. Available 
at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11629.
51 The 62 grantees include all 50 states, four metropolitan areas (Chicago, Los Angeles County, New 
York City, and Washington, D.C.), five territories (Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, 
American Samoa, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), and three freely associated states (the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau, and the Marshall Islands).
52 A complete listing of the Preparedness and Emergency Response Research Centers is available at 
www.cdc.gov/media/pressrel/2008/r081006.htm.
53 Available at www.bt.cdc.gov/cerc/pdf/CERC-SEPT02.pdf.
67Public Health Preparedness:
Strengthening CDC’s Emergency Response
Endnotes
54 More information is available at www.meta-leadershipsummit.org.
55 The pilot phase included additional summits in Wichita, KS; Denver, CO; Louisville, KY; and 
Princeton, NJ.
56 Social distancing refers to measures to decrease the frequency of contact among people to decrease 
the risk of spread of communicable diseases.  This could include measures such as school dismissal 
and staying at home when sick.
57 More information is available at www2a.cdc.gov/phlp/index.asp.
58 The focus papers were supported with TPER funds. The white paper was funded by CDC’s Office 
of the Chief Science Officer.  
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Increase the use and development of interventions known 
to prevent human illness from chemical, biological, or 




Decrease the time needed to classify health events as 
terrorism or naturally occurring in partnership with other 
agencies. 
Goal 3
Decrease the time needed to detect and report chemical, 
biological, or radiological agents in tissue, food or 
environmental samples that cause threats to the public’s 
health. 
Goal 4 Improve the timeliness and accuracy of communications regarding threats to the public’s health.
Investigate
Goal 5
Decrease the time to identify causes, risk factors, and 




Decrease the time needed to provide countermeasures and 




Goal 7 Decrease the time needed to restore health services and environmental safety to pre-event levels.
Goal 8 Improve the long-term follow-up provided to those affected by threats to the public’s health.
Improve
Goal 9
Decrease the time needed to implement recommendations 
from after-action reports following threats to the public’s 
health.
CDC Preparedness Goals
CDC has established nine goals for achieving the overarching 
preparedness goal, “People prepared for emerging health threats –  
people in all communities will be protected from infectious,  
occupational, environmental, and terrorist threats.”
A CDC Report on Terrorism Preparedness and 
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